Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter argues that epistemologists have misapplied the term ‘justified’ by relying on an impoverished menu of normative options, and in particular by neglecting the category of excuses, for example when classifying as justified the false beliefs of victims of sceptical scenarios. More generally, any norm is shown to generate various logically independent derivative norms, such as being disposed to comply with the primary norm, and doing what someone disposed to comply with the primary norm would do. These distinctions are illustrated with respect to norms of keeping promises and obeying the law. Any norm of fitting one’s belief to one’s evidence is shown to be violated in some cases by agents disposed to comply with it. That victims of sceptical scenarios believe in accord with laudable cognitive dispositions does not show that they are complying with the primary norm of belief.
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Cites
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Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility
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The global workspace needs metacognition
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Cited by
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Smithies, D. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199917662.001.0001 · Cited by 271
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Whiting, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01905-z · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, T.
- Venue
- Good as Usual
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2025-01-16
- Pages
- 149-166
- OpenAlex
- W4406108865
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 155.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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