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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios

Williamson, Timothy · 2025 · Good as Usual
Cited by 167

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This chapter argues that epistemologists have misapplied the term ‘justified’ by relying on an impoverished menu of normative options, and in particular by neglecting the category of excuses, for example when classifying as justified the false beliefs of victims of sceptical scenarios. More generally, any norm is shown to generate various logically independent derivative norms, such as being disposed to comply with the primary norm, and doing what someone disposed to comply with the primary norm would do. These distinctions are illustrated with respect to norms of keeping promises and obeying the law. Any norm of fitting one’s belief to one’s evidence is shown to be violated in some cases by agents disposed to comply with it. That victims of sceptical scenarios believe in accord with laudable cognitive dispositions does not show that they are complying with the primary norm of belief.

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Metadata

Authors
Williamson, T.
Venue
Good as Usual
Published
2025-01-16
Pages
149-166
OpenAlex
W4406108865
Cited by
167
References
8
FWCI
155.00
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/9780191982439.003.0009
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Williamson, T. (2025). Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios. Good as Usual. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191982439.003.0009

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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