Who Is the Controller of Controlled Processes?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Controlled processes are viewed as conscious, effortful, and intentional, and as drawing on more sources of information than automatic processes. With this power of conscious will, controlled processes seem to bring the civilized quality back to psychological explanation that automatic processes leave out. Yet by reintroducing this touch of humanity, the notion of a controlled process also brings us within glimpsing range of a fatal theoretical error—the idea that there is a controller. This chapter begins by examining why the notion of a controller is a problem. It shows that theories of controlled processes often imply that the person (or some other inner agent such as “consciousness” or “the will” or “the self”) is a legitimate possible cause of the person's observed thought or behavior. This supposition undermines the possibility of a scientific theory of psychology by creating an explanatory entity that cannot itself be explained. This chapter also discusses the homunculus problem, apparent mental causation, real mental causation, and virtual agency.
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Cites
Human Memory: A Proposed System and its Control Processes
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60422-3 · Cited by 7,216
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 1×
“…course, that most current cognitive and social cognitive research focuses specifically on the automatic side of this dichotomy, so much so that there seems to be progressively less room for the "little person in the head" (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; but see Bargh & Ferguson, 2000).”
BackgroundAn Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1416950 · Cited by 3,340
Ironic processes of mental control.
Wegner, D. M. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.101.1.34 · Cited by 2,609
Self-citationBeyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes.
Bargh, J. A., & Ferguson, M. J. (2000) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.126.6.925 · Cited by 1,150
Cited by
The evolution and psychology of self-deception
von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10001354 · Cited by 736
The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework
Pacherie, E. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003 · Cited by 618
Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories
Uleman, J. S., Adil Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093707 · Cited by 505
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
Bering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458
“Discussions of the function of an authorship emotion for physical action point to the need for a controller of action, an internal operator who guides our decisions (e.g., see Wegner 2005).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Wegner, D. M.
- Venue
- The New Unconscious
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2006-08-24
- Pages
- 18-36
- OpenAlex
- W606423883
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 30.13
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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