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Cited by 618Free Will and AgencyEmbodied and Extended CognitionPhenomenology and Existential Philosophy

The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework

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Pacherie, Elisabeth·2008·Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003
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Abstract

After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through which the phenomenology of action is generated and the processes involved in the specification and control of action are strongly interconnected. I argue in favor of a three-tiered dynamic model of intention, link it to an expanded version of the internal model theory of action control and specification, and use this theoretical framework to guide an analysis of the contents, possible sources and temporal course of complementary aspects of the phenomenology of action.

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  • Hierarchical predictive control was originally proposed for complex movement control by Haruno et al. (2003) and Pacherie (2008).

    “Such a scheme has been originally proposed for complex movement control by Haruno et al. (2003) and Pacherie (2008).”

    From The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework (2019) · cites this paper as Pacherie, 2008

    In §3, Pacherie proposes combining predictive internal models with three levels of intention to form a hierarchical framework for action specification and control. But she describes this as an extension of an existing motor-control model, not as the original proposal of predictive control for complex movements. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • The experience of being the author of one's actions and to be able to selectively control a body at will with the help of explicit goal-representations is a central enabling condition for the development of MPS.

    “The experience of being the author of one's actions and to be able to selectively control a body at will with the help of explicit goal-repres-entations certainly is a central enabling condition for the development of MPS [11].”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [11]

    Section 6, “Sense of agency,” defines agency as the sense of being the author of an action; Sections 2.3 and 3 describe how goals and intentions guide action selection and control. The paper does not say that these experiences are a central enabling condition for the development of MPS. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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  • Besides the sense of ownership, we also experience intentional movements as realisations of our agency.

    “That is, besides the sense of ownership, we also experience intentional movements as realisations of our agency (Bayne, 2008;Pacherie, 2008).”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Pacherie, 2008

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. [40]40. Hornsby, J. (1980). Actions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  2. [45]45. Jeannerod, M. (2006). Motor cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  3. [50]50. Marcel, A. (2003). The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness (pp. 48-93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  4. [57]57. Pacherie, E. (1996). La schizophre ´nie comme de ´re ´glement de l'action -Compte rendu critique de C.D. Frith, Neuropsychologie cognitive de la schizophre ´nie. In I. Joseph, & J. Proust (Eds.) La raison dans la place, Raisons pratiques, Vol. 7 (pp. 285-295).
  5. [66]66. Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Authors
Pacherie, E.
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-04
Volume
107
Issue
1
Pages
179-217
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003
OpenAlex
W1971320526
Cited by
618
References
91
Citations by year
2026: 37 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 38 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 35 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 40 · 2012: 29
FWCI
6.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
phenomenology of action, agency, intention, action control, action specification
MeSH terms
Awareness, Humans, Psychological Theory, Psychomotor Performance, Intention

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