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The growth of causal understandings of natural kinds
Abstract
This chapter discusses causal understandings of one type of natural kind — living things. It considers three themes: one cannot build a coherent account of our concepts of the natural world without some hypotheses about how that world is really structured; the property homeostasis view of natural kinds fits with a psychological model of concepts as always embedded in theory-like structures which owe their origins to a small but diverse set of fundamental modes of construal — a model that posits a specific view of conceptual change; and one key part of these early modes of construal may be more general expectations about how the causal powers of types of properties, such as colours versus shapes, vary strongly as a function of these general categories and not at more fine-grained levels.
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Citations
Cited by
Gopnik, A., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., & Glymour, C. (2001) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037//0012-1649.37.5.620 · Cited by 523
The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children
Kelemen, D. (1999) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00010-4 · Cited by 491
The Human Function Compunction: Teleological explanation in adults
Kelemen, D., & Rosset, E. (2009) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.001 · Cited by 480
Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0030399 · Cited by 429
Gelman, R. (2002) · Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1002/0471214426.pas0212 · Cited by 398
Metadata
- Authors
- Keil, F. C.
- Venue
- Causal Cognition
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 1996-07-11
- Pages
- 234-262
- OpenAlex
- W128872872
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 47.38
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Keil, F. C. (1996). The growth of causal understandings of natural kinds. Causal Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198524021.003.0009
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.