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Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms*
Abstract
This chapter argues that many of the standard arguments for the causal inertness of the mental rest on mistaken assumptions about causality and causal explanation. An interventionist account undercuts these assumptions. Interventionism allows for explanations involving macroscopic variables as well as microscopic variables. So, depending on the details of the case, it can explain the causal efficacy and explanatory power of multiple realisable mental states. When it comes to the causal exclusion argument, the chapter rejects the exclusion principle according to which if an event has a sufficient cause, then no distinct event can be a cause of it, unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination. An event being causally sufficient for some effect does not exclude some distinct event from causing or being causally relevant to that effect, even in the absence of overdetermination.
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Citations
Cites
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
Pearl, J. (2009) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803161 · Cited by 11,653
Cited by
Grounding in the image of causation
Schaffer, J. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1 · Cited by 551
Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle
List, C., Menzies, P., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2009) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2009106936 · Cited by 340
Interventionism and Causal Exclusion
Woodward, J. (2015) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12095 · Cited by 255
Self-citationSentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22050516 · Cited by 186
Causal discovery and the problem of psychological interventions
Eronen, M. I. (2020) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100785 · Cited by 102
Metadata
- Authors
- Woodward, J.
- Venue
- Being Reduced
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2008-09-04
- Pages
- 218-262
- OpenAlex
- W1597013416
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 38.56
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.