The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Interventionism and Causal Exclusion
Abstract
A number of writers, myself included, have recently argued that an “interventionist” treatment of causation of the sort defended in Woodward, 2003 can be used to cast light on so‐called “causal exclusion” arguments. This interventionist treatment of causal exclusion has in turn been criticized by other philosophers. This paper responds to these criticisms. It describes an interventionist framework for thinking about causal relationships when supervenience relations are present. I contend that this framework helps us to see that standard arguments for causal exclusion involve mistaken assumptions about what it is appropriate to control for or hold fixed in assessing causal claims. The framework also provides a natural way of capturing the idea that properties that supervene on but that are not identical with realizing properties can be causally efficacious.
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Citations
Cites
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (2001) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1754.001.0001 · Cited by 4,521
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-5840 · Cited by 3,371
Causality: models, reasoning, and inference
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-1494a · Cited by 2,873
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
Kim, J. (1998) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4629.001.0001 · Cited by 1,241
Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle
List, C., Menzies, P., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2009) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2009106936 · Cited by 340
Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms*
Woodward, J. (2008) · Being Reduced · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0013 · Cited by 161
Self-citationKim, J. (1973) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025312 · Cited by 142
Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences
Raatikainen, P. (2010) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9236-0 · Cited by 127
Causal Inference of Ambiguous Manipulations
Spirtes, P., & Scheines, R. (2004) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/425058 · Cited by 99
Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non‐reductive Physicalism
Baumgärtner, M. (2009) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698590903006909 · Cited by 98
Cited by
Psychopathological networks: Theory, methods and practice
Bringmann, L. F., Albers, C., Bockting, C., Borsboom, D., Ceulemans, E., Cramer, A., Epskamp, S., Eronen, M. I., Hamaker, E., Kuppens, P., et al. (2022) · Behaviour Research and Therapy · doi:10.1016/j.brat.2021.104011 · Cited by 300
Wilson, A. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12190 · Cited by 267
Causal discovery and the problem of psychological interventions
Eronen, M. I. (2020) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100785 · Cited by 102
Causal emergence from effective information: Neither causal nor emergent?
Dewhurst, J., & Philosophy Documentation Center (2021) · Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1002/tht3.489 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Woodward, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-04-07
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 303-347
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1987597721
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 82.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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