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In two minds: Dual processes and beyond
Abstract
This book explores the idea that we have two minds – one being automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years, there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning: an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast; and a more recent, distinctively human system which is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. The book brings together researchers on dual processes to summarize the latest research, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture, and by psychologists specializing in traditionally distinct and isolated fields.
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Citations
Cites
Evidence-Based and Intuition-Based Self-Knowledge: An fMRI Study.
Lieberman, M. D., Jarcho, J. M., & Satpute, A. B. (2004) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.4.421 · Cited by 272
Cited by
Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/a0016755 · Cited by 2,443
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.12001 · Cited by 1,381
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1 · Cited by 1,047
A Universal Model of Diagnostic Reasoning
Croskerry, P. (2009) · Academic Medicine · doi:10.1097/acm.0b013e3181ace703 · Cited by 1,016
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Metadata
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-01-29
- OpenAlex
- W1670538066
- Cited by
- 928
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 29.61
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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