The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 64 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Universal Model of Diagnostic Reasoning
Abstract
Clinical judgment is a critical aspect of physician performance in medicine. It is essential in the formulation of a diagnosis and key to the effective and safe management of patients. Yet, the overall diagnostic error rate remains unacceptably high. In more than four decades of research, a variety of approaches have been taken, but a consensus approach toward diagnostic decision making has not emerged. In the last 20 years, important gains have been made in psychological research on human judgment. Dual-process theory has emerged as the predominant approach, positing two systems of decision making, System 1 (heuristic, intuitive) and System 2 (systematic, analytical). The author proposes a schematic model that uses the theory to develop a universal approach toward clinical decision making. Properties of the model explain many of the observed characteristics of physicians' performance. Yet the author cautions that not all medical reasoning and decision making falls neatly into one or the other of the model's systems, even though they provide a basic framework incorporating the recognized diverse approaches. He also emphasizes the complexity of decision making in actual clinical situations and the urgent need for more research to help clinicians gain additional insight and understanding regarding their decision making.
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“While prior work has established ample evidence of cognitive biases in high-stakes domain [16,17,31,56,58,89]”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
Citations
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Cited by
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
Designing Theory-Driven User-Centric Explainable AI
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Cognitive debiasing 1: origins of bias and theory of debiasing
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“23 In the figure, the intuitive system is schematised as Type 1 processes and the analytic system by Type 2 processes.”
BackgroundSelf-citationNorman, G. R., Monteiro, S. D., Sherbino, J., Ilgen, J. S., Schmidt, H. G., & Mamede, S. (2017) · Academic Medicine · doi:10.1097/acm.0000000000001421 · Cited by 594
From Mindless to Mindful Practice — Cognitive Bias and Clinical Decision Making
Croskerry, P. (2013) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmp1303712 · Cited by 571
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Croskerry, P.
- Affiliations
- Dalhousie University (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Croskerry, Pat
- ORCID
- Croskerry, Pat
- Venue
- Academic Medicine
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-08
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1022-1028
- ISSN
- 1040-2446 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2055476838
- Cited by
- 1,016
- References
- 64
- Citations by year
- 2026: 105 · 2025: 83 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 67 · 2022: 61 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 62 · 2019: 74 · 2018: 60 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 46 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 53 · 2013: 59 · 2012: 39
- FWCI
- 23.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academic Medicine (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Health Sciences Research and Education
- Keywords
- diagnostic reasoning, clinical judgment, dual-process theory, System 1 and System 2, clinical decision-making, diagnostic errors, heuristic reasoning, diagnosis, physician performance
- MeSH terms
- Clinical Competence, Decision Making, Diagnosis, Differential, Humans, Judgment, Models, Theoretical, Physicians, Problem Solving
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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