The DOI matches its Crossref record; 123 of the 123 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics
Abstract
This book is about the role causation plays in the attribution of both moral responsibility and legal liability (in the law of crimes, torts, and to a lesser extent, contracts). The book strips away many of the usages of the word ‘causation’ in law and legal theory, on the grounds that such usages have little to do with causation itself. What remains is the law's use of ‘causation’ to name a natural relation that is at the heart of both ordinary and scientific explanations of the world. Some normative defense is offered as to why causation in this sense is a proper basis for assessing degrees of both culpability and permissibility in morality and also in law. A more extended metaphysical defense is also offered, as to the nature of the causal relation and as to the nature of the things related by the causal relation. This normative and metaphysical analysis is used as the springboard from which to critique much of what the law currently says about causation, including the law's counterfactual test for cause in fact, its notions of intervening cause, foreseeability, harm within the risk, accomplice liability, the causal status of omissions and of non-omissive allowings, and more besides. The result is a rethinking of causation's nature and role in our legal and moral practices of assigning blame and responsibility.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals
Lagnado, D. A., Gerstenberg, T., & Zultan, R. (2013) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12054 · Cited by 191
Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
Grinfeld, G., Lagnado, D., Gerstenberg, T., Woodward, J. F., & Usher, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 · Cited by 41
“…causal responsibility an agent has for the effects of her actions is thought to play a major role in the attribution of the agent’s legal, moral and even criminal responsibility (Hart and Honoré, 1959; Tadros, 2005; Moore, 2009; Lagnado and Gerstenberg, 2017; Usher, 2018).”
BackgroundPortable Causal Dependence: A Tale of Consilience
Hitchcock, C. (2012) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/667899 · Cited by 32
Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
Usher, M. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12537 · Cited by 29
Thinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck
Nelkin, D. K. (2019) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12101 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, M. S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-01-22
- OpenAlex
- W4242091048
- Cited by
- 362
- References
- 123
- FWCI
- 5.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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