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Fear of Knowledge
Abstract
Paul Boghossian sweeps away relativist claims that there is no such thing as objective truth or knowledge, but only truth or knowledge from a particular perspective. He shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists, and will prove provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.
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Citations
Cited by
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Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology
Jost, J. T. (2017) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12407 · Cited by 696
On the powers of powerful knowledge
Young, M., & Muller, J. (2013) · Review of Education · doi:10.1002/rev3.3017 · Cited by 422
YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1
White, R. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x · Cited by 269
Epistemic beliefs’ role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation
Garrett, R. K., & Weeks, B. E. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0184733 · Cited by 167
Metadata
- Authors
- Boghossian, P.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2006-02-23
- OpenAlex
- W2498235451
- Cited by
- 562
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 41.81
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fear of Knowledge. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287185.001.0001
- The paper
- Boghossian, P. (2006). Fear of Knowledge. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199287185.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.