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Cited by 432Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy of Biology and Scientific ExplanationEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism

Chalmers, David J.·2016·Panpsychism
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002
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Abstract

The chapter presents the Hegelian Argument for panpsychism. It is inspired by Hegel’s dialectical method in exploring the possibility of a conceptual middle-ground between materialism and dualism. It seeks a ‘synthesis’ between these two antithetical positions. The chapter establishes this synthesis by elucidating the opposition of materialism and dualism, as well as their respective strengths and weaknesses: Materialism is supported by causal arguments, which claim that causal explanations must be grounded in physical properties. If phenomenal properties are to be causally relevant, they have to be grounded in physical properties. This entails the truth of materialism. Conceivability arguments undermine the truth of materialism: There is no strong modal entailment between physical and phenomenal properties; physicalism requires that physical facts necessitate all other facts. Conversely, dualism is supported by conceivability arguments and heavily criticized by causal arguments. It presents constitutive Russellian panpsychism as a promising synthesis in this dialectic.

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Chalmers, D.J. forthcoming. The combination problem for panpsychism. In (G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, eds.) Panpsychism . Oxford University Press.
  2. Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons . Oxford University Press.
  3. Yablo, S. 1992. Mental causation. Philosophical Review 101:245-280.

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Metadata

Authors
Chalmers, D. J.
Corresponding author
Chalmers, David J.
ORCID
Chalmers, David J.
Venue
Panpsychism
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2016-12-29
Volume
8
Pages
19-47
DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002
OpenAlex
W2532347072
Cited by
432
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 53 · 2023: 72 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 51 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 15
FWCI
185.79
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
panpsychism, Hegel, materialism, dualism, phenomenal properties, conceivability argument, causal argument, physicalism, dialectical synthesis

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