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The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem
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This chapter identifies certain theses which in conjunction entail the conceptual core of the combination problem: conceptual isolation of subjects, the transparency conceivability principle, and phenomenal transparency. They lead to the following principle: “For any group of subjects, instantiating certain conscious states, it is possible that just subjects with those states exist in the absence of any further subject.” The critic of panpsychism could conclude that lower-level conscious individuals cannot account for higher-level conscious individuals. The chapter claims that this conclusion does not follow because the principle does not rule out the existence of a phenomenal bonding relation at the microlevel. It explores various answers to the question of when and in what conditions subjects become phenomenally bonded and so forth. Having rejected the alternatives, the chapter is prepared to accept unrestricted phenomenal composition: subjects always combine to make further subjects.
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“…to humans [19], or to biological organisms [20, 21], or to systems with a certain informational structure [22]; but others ascribe it much more liberally — to fundamental particles [16, 23], to every arrangement of fundamental particles [24, 25], and to the universe as a whole [16, 26].”
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Jylkkä, J. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2391433 · Cited by 10
“For example, Goff has defended a notion of phenomenal bonding as a response to the combination problem (Goff, 2016), and Albahari (2019) argues that a more idealistic version of panpsychism does not succumb to the combination problem at all.”
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Brüntrup, G., Göcke, B. P., Jaskolla, L. J., Medhananda, S., Pfeifer, K., Walker, T., Oord, T. J., Meixner, U., Goff, P., Clayton, P., et al. (2019) · Brill | mentis eBooks · doi:10.30965/9783957437303 · Cited by 9
Self-citationGöcke, B. P. (2020) · Brill | mentis eBooks · doi:10.30965/9783957437303_004 · Cited by 6
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“Perhaps the most notable among these is his “phenomenal boding” proposal (Goff 2016). consciousness+ panpsychism avoids both the combination and the missing entities problem.”
BackgroundInfluentialRussellian monism: ignorance and prospects
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“That the subject summing argument is about an explanatory gap is widely recognised within the literature (Chalmers 2016; Goff 2009b).”
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Efimov, I. P., & Ладов, В. А. (2019) · Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta Filosofiya Sotsiologiya Politologiya · doi:10.17223/1998863x/50/3
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Voigt, U. (2020) · Brill | mentis eBooks · doi:10.30965/9783957437303_009
“54 For this conception, cf. Goff 2017a: 287-290.”
BackgroundInfluentialRoelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0009
É a colônia de formigas um organismo consciente?
Fonseca, A. L. D. V. (2023) · Griot Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.31977/grirfi.v23i1.3220
Panpsychism and Pantheism. An Uneasy Alliance?
Jarocki, J. (2023) · Roczniki Filozoficzne · doi:10.18290/rf237102.10
An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts
Rookmaaker, A. (2024) · Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1515/krt-2023-0025
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.002.0004
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.002.0007
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.002.0005
Rāmānuja’s cosmopsychist-panentheistic solution to the hard problem of consciousness
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“(Goff, 2016 , p. 269) 6 We use ‘subject’ here in the operational sense of control and valuation loci within a system’s architecture (Beni, 2024 ), compatible with Dennett’s intentional stance.”
Cermeño-Aínsa, S. (2025) · Crítica (México D F En línea) · doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1748
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“This is particularly pressing for those such as Chalmers (2013/2015) and Goff (2014/2017b, 2019), who hold at least some hope that RM might serve as a research program capable of “unearthing a domain of reality” relevant to advancing the science of consciousness (pp. 10 –11).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Goff, P.
- Corresponding author
- Goff, Philip
- ORCID
- Goff, Philip
- Venue
- Panpsychism
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-12-29
- Pages
- 283-302
- OpenAlex
- W2263072957
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 39.36
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- combination problem, panpsychism, phenomenal transparency, consciousness, subjectivity
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