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Knowledge as a Mental State

Open access
Nagel, Jennifer · 2013 · Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4

Abstract

In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental states includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines why developmental, comparative, and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers—with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson—have not. The disagreement is traced back to a difference in how each side understands the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and belief, concepts which are understood in both disciplines to be closely linked. Psychologists and philosophers other than Williamson have generally disagreed about which of the pair is prior. The rival claims of priority are examined both in the light of philosophical arguments by Williamson and others, and in the light of empirical work on mental state attribution.

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Metadata

Authors
Nagel, J.
Venue
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4
Published
2013-04-25
Pages
272-308
OpenAlex
W75843438
Cited by
164
References
17
FWCI
56.71
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Knowledge as a Mental State. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0010
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Nagel, J. (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199672707.003.0010

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