The DOI matches its Crossref record; 404 of the 404 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moral Character: An Empirical Theory
Abstract
Most of our friends, colleagues, and even family members are not virtuous people. They do not have virtues such as compassion, honesty, or courage. But at the same time, they are not vicious people either. They do not have vices such as cruelty, dishonesty, or cowardice. Instead most people today have characters which do not qualify as either virtuous or vicious. They have many positive moral features, but also many negative ones too. Our characters are decidedly mixed, and are much more complex than we might have thought. On the one hand, many of us would kill an innocent person in a matter of minutes under pressure from an authority figure as part of a psychology study. Or we would pretend to not see someone collapse from an apparent heart attack across the street. Yet it is also true that many of us would help another person when we are by ourselves and hear sounds of a non-ambiguous emergency in the next room. Or we would come to the aid of a friend when feeling empathy for her need, and do so for altruistic rather than egoistic reasons. The goal of this book is to outline a new picture of our moral character which involves what are called Mixed Character Traits. This picture can help make sense of how most of us are less that virtuous people but also morally better than the vicious.
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Cited by
The Light vs. Dark Triad of Personality: Contrasting Two Very Different Profiles of Human Nature
Kaufman, S. B., Yaden, D. B., Hyde, E., & Tsukayama, E. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00467 · Cited by 359
Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability
(2017) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0009 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, C. B.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2013-05-02
- OpenAlex
- W4243137167
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 404
- FWCI
- 13.87
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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