The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
Abstract
This chapter argues for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects—a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition—would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim is set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions. A preliminary report on these studies is presented in Section 3. In light of these studies, it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence presented, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. Section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, considers some of the ways in which defenders of the projects being criticized might reply to the challenge.
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Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?
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Cited by
Semantics, cross-cultural style
Machery, E. (2004) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2003.10.003 · Cited by 697
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Self-citationSurveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Kornblith, H. (2016) · The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.8 · Cited by 331
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Metadata
- Authors
- Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S.
- Venue
- Collected Papers, Volume 2
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2012-08-13
- Pages
- 159-190
- OpenAlex
- W1972517406
- Cited by
- 520
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 407.35
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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