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On What Matters: Volume Two
Abstract
This book is an important text in moral philosophy. It follows from the 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. The book presents a new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories — Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism — leading to a new synthetic conclusion. Along the way the volume discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. This book consists of four parts. The first part presents critiques of previous work by four of the world's leading moral philosophers. The second part contains responses. The third and longest part is a self-contained work on normativity, and the final part comprises seven chapters on Kant, reasons, irrationality, autonomy — and why the universe exists.
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“It is worth noting that not only moral anti-realists and skeptics but also non-skeptical moral realists have often taken the challenges posed by moral disagreement very seriously”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Parfit 2011
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Metadata
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2011-05-26
- OpenAlex
- W4240707855
- Cited by
- 216
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 6.75
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- reason, rationality, normativity, moral theory, Kantian ethics, contractualism, consequentialism, consent, free will, moral responsibility, irrationality, autonomy, Reasons and Persons, existence of the universe
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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