The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On What Matters: Volume Two
Abstract
This book is an important text in moral philosophy. It follows from the 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. The book presents a new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories — Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism — leading to a new synthetic conclusion. Along the way the volume discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. This book consists of four parts. The first part presents critiques of previous work by four of the world's leading moral philosophers. The second part contains responses. The third and longest part is a self-contained work on normativity, and the final part comprises seven chapters on Kant, reasons, irrationality, autonomy — and why the universe exists.
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“It is worth noting that not only moral anti-realists and skeptics but also non-skeptical moral realists have often taken the challenges posed by moral disagreement very seriously”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Parfit 2011
Citations
Cites
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Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
Kant, I., & Korsgaard, C. M. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809590.004 · Cited by 3,775
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Street, S. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 · Cited by 1,247
Talmor, E. (1986) · History of European Ideas · doi:10.1016/0191-6599(86)90019-7 · Cited by 1,061
Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness
Guyer, P. D. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173339 · Cited by 996
Contractualism and utilitarianism
Scanlon, Т. М. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511611964.007 · Cited by 983
Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason
Chang, R. (1997) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 961
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
Dombrowski, D. A. (2001) · International Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5840/ipq200141441 · Cited by 787
Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends
Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., & Railton, P. (1992) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185045 · Cited by 584
Robledo, L. S. (2008) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2008-0010 · Cited by 529
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McGee, A. J., & Foster, C. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5_6
McGee, A. J., & Foster, C. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5_5
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Kleingeld, P. (2024) · Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie · doi:10.1007/s42048-024-00175-4
The normativity objection and the coloring strategy
Zhao, X. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04726-5
Hoekstra, M., Lousberg, L., Rooij, R., Floet, W. W., & Zijlstra, S. (2024) · doi:10.59490/tb.99
A jogi norma és a jogi döntés. Autoritások és döntések a globális jogi pluralizmus korában
Fábián, Á. (2025) · Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem · doi:10.15476/elte.2024.122
How can the first order come first?
Zormpalas, S. O. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02385-x
Relying on Intuitions in Moral and Political Philosophy: A Practice with No Support
Tyssedal, J. J. (2025) · The Journal of Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10892-025-09535-7
Metaethical Minimalism Without Costs
Jack, E., & Khuramy, M. (2025) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-025-00900-2
Russell, B. A. (2025) · Religions · doi:10.3390/rel16121575
Sherwood, C. N. C. (2026) · LSE Press eBooks · doi:10.31389/lsepress.afb
Why representationalists can’t be desire theorists (and vice versa)
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Functionalism and the Problem of Systematic Irrationality
Ratoff, W. (2026) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-026-01116-w
Non-realist cognitivism, superassertibility and vicious regress
Ferrie, C. P. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05771-y
Metadata
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2011-05-26
- OpenAlex
- W4240707855
- Cited by
- 216
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 6.75
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- reason, rationality, normativity, moral theory, Kantian ethics, contractualism, consequentialism, consent, free will, moral responsibility, irrationality, autonomy, Reasons and Persons, existence of the universe
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