The Value of Consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent work within such disparate research areas as the epistemology of perception, theories of well-being, animal and medical ethics, the philosophy of consciousness and theories of understanding in philosophy of science and epistemology has featured disconnected discussions of what is arguably a single underlying question: What is the value of consciousness? The purpose of this article is to review some of this work and place it within a unified theoretical framework that makes contributions (and contributors) from these disparate areas more visible to one another. Before reviewing recent work bearing on the question ‘What is the value of consciousness?’, it might be useful to get clearer on what the question means. When we speak about the value of X, there are three different kinds of value we might have in mind: epistemic, ethical or aesthetic. These are fundamentally distinct and incommensurable: one may find a certain quantity Q of epistemic value more valuable than some quantity Q* of epistemic value, but when considering a quantity Q of epistemic value and a quantity Q* of ethical value, no meaning attaches to the question of which is more valuable simpliciter.
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Cites
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 1×
“Most famously, Ned Block (1995) warned against conflating ‘phenomenal’ and ‘access’ consciousness.”
CRISP, R. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x · Cited by 282
Consciousness and Moral Status
Shepherd, J. (2018) · doi:10.4324/9781315396347 · Cited by 161
Cited by
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“According to the dominant view, moral status is determined by sentience, i.e. the capacity to undergo pleasant and unpleasant conscious experiences such as joy, pain and fear (Kriegel 2019; Nussbaum 2007; Singer 2011).”
BackgroundSentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6 · Cited by 36
“The view that phenomenal consciousness is morally significant is widely held across philosophy (Kriegel 2019), and variants of this view are influential in discussions of moral status (Harman 2003, Shepherd 2018, DeGrazia 2021) well-being (van der Deijl 2021, Lin 2021), and intrinsic value (Lee…”
BackgroundHow to deal with risks of AI suffering
Dung, L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2238287 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Kriegel, U.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2019-07-01
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 503-520
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2954180786
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 3.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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