The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Multiple Realizability and Universality
Abstract
This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics literature. It is argued that the same explanatory strategy used by physicists to provide understanding of universal behavior in physics can be used to explain how special science properties can be heterogeneously multiply realized.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
Fodor, J. A. (1974) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485230 · Cited by 1,815
Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2010.001.0001 · Cited by 1,757
Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction.
Kim, J. (1992) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2107741 · Cited by 615
Cited by
Social Emergence: Societies As Complex Systems
Sawyer, R. K. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511734892 · Cited by 724
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
Rupert, R. D. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001 · Cited by 411
Batterman, R. W., & Rice, C. C. (2014) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/676677 · Cited by 310
Self-citationReutlinger, A. (2016) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/687859 · Cited by 116
Across the Boundaries: Extrapolation in Biology and Social Science
Steel, D. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331448.001.0001 · Cited by 109
Metadata
- Authors
- Batterman, R. W.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-03-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-145
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2054074420
- Cited by
- 243
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 46.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Multiple Realizability and Universality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/bjps/51.1.115
- The paper
- Batterman, R. W. (2000). Multiple Realizability and Universality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/51.1.115
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.