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Cited by 464

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Grimm, Stephen R.·2006·The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of “grasping” that seems to be characteristic of understanding differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge. 1. Zagzebski's account 2. Kvanvig's account 3. Two problems 4. Comanche cases 5. Unreliable sources of information 6. The upper-right quadrant 7. So is understanding a species of knowledge? 8. A false choice

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Metadata

Authors
Grimm, S. R.
Venue
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Published
2006-09-01
Volume
57
Issue
3
Pages
515-535
ISSN
  • 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3537
OpenAlex
W2038906023
Cited by
464
References
22
FWCI
16.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/bjps/axl015
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Grimm, S. R. (2006). Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl015

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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