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Deterministic Chance?
Abstract
Can there be deterministic chance? That is, can there be objective chance values other than 0 or 1, in a deterministic world? I will argue that the answer is no. In a deterministic world, the only function that can play the role of chance is one that outputs just 0s and 1s. The role of chance involves connections from chance to credence, possibility, time, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. These connections do not allow for deterministic chance. 1. Overview2. Four Arguments for Deterministic Chance3. Four Conceptions of Deterministic Chance4. The Role of Chance5. The Case against Posterior Deterministic Chance6. The Case against Initial Deterministic Chance7. Epistemic Chance
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The Realization Principle says that if a proposition has a chance of more than zero, there must be a possible world where the history is the same as what it actually is, the laws are the same, and where the proposition is true.
“the Realization Principle of Schaffer (2007) (a strengthening of the Basic Chance Principle of Bigelow et al. (1993)) says that if proposition has a chance of more than zero, there must be a possible world where the history is the same as what it actually is, the laws are the same, and where the proposition is true.”
From Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature (2020) · cites this paper as Schaffer (2007)
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Research works printed but not linked: 22
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature
Bhogal, H. (2020) · Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12 · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893314.003.0006 · Cited by 74
Gessell, B. (2017) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9601-3 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Schaffer, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Massachusetts Amherst (US)
- Corresponding author
- Schaffer, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Schaffer, Jonathan
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-06-01
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 113-140
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W4252040610
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 28.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- objective chance, determinism, degrees of belief, possibility, time, lawhood, causality
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