The DOI matches its Crossref record; 88 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some vegetative state patients might indeed be conscious, although they fall short of being demonstrative. The fact that some vegetative state patients show evidence of consciousness according to the standard approach is remarkable, for the standard approach to consciousness is rather conservative, and leaves open the pressing question of how to ascertain whether patients who fail such tests are conscious or not. We argue for a cluster-based 'natural kind' methodology that is adequate to that task, both as a replacement for the approach that currently informs research into the presence or absence of consciousness in vegetative state patients and as a methodology for the science of consciousness more generally.
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“A third strategy for validating a putative C-test involves treating consciousness as a natural kind [67,68].”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [68]
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Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Self-citationWhitney, D. C., & Leib, A. Y. (2017) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044232 · Cited by 516
Are there levels of consciousness?
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.009 · Cited by 438
Self-citationThe search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shea, N., & Bayne, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2010-09-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 459-484
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- PMC
- PMC3361721
- OpenAlex
- W2106826983
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 7.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Research Portal (King's College London) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (086041)
- University of Oxford
- Australian Research Council (DP0984572)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Clinical Neurology › Traumatic Brain Injury Research
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- vegetative state, consciousness, consciousness studies, natural kinds, clustering, consciousness assessment
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