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Misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are based on imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of one's actions
Abstract
The experience of being the initiator of one's own actions seems to be infallible at first glance. Misattributions of agency of one's actions in certain neurological or psychiatric patients reveal, however, that the central mechanisms underlying this experience can go astray. In particular, delusions of influence in schizophrenia might result from deficits in an inferential mechanism that allows distinguishing whether or not a sensory event has been self-produced. This distinction is made by comparing the actual sensory information with the consequences of one's action as predicted on the basis of internal action-related signals such as efference copies. If this internal prediction matches the actual sensory event, an action is registered as self-caused; in case of a mismatch, the difference is interpreted as externally produced. We tested the hypothesis that delusions of influence are based on deficits in this comparator mechanism. In particular, we tested whether patients' impairments in action attribution tasks are caused by imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of self-action. Schizophrenia patients and matched controls performed pointing movements in a virtual-reality setup in which the visual consequences of movements could be rotated with respect to the actual movement. Experiment 1 revealed higher thresholds for detecting experimental feedback rotations in the patient group. The size of these thresholds correlated positively with patients' delusions of influence. Experiment 2 required subjects to estimate their direction of pointing visually in the presence of constantly rotated visual feedback. When compared to controls, patients' estimates were significantly better adapted to the feedback rotation and exhibited an increased variability. In interleaved trials without visual feedback, i.e. when pointing estimates relied solely on internal action-related signals, this variability was likewise increased and correlated with both delusions of influence and the size of patients' detection thresholds as assessed in the first experiment. These findings support the notion that delusions of influence are based on imprecise internal predictions about the sensory consequences of one's actions. Moreover, we suggest that such imprecise predictions prompt patients to rely more strongly on (and thus adapt to) external agency cues, in this case vision. Such context-dependent weighted integration of imprecise internal predictions and alternative agency cues might thus reflect the common basis for the various misattributions of agency in schizophrenia patients.
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In the citing paper
“This view has been finessed in terms of abnormal encoding of the relative precision of priors and sensory evidence to account for a broad range of psychotic symptoms [79,80].”
From Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self (2013) · cites this paper as [80]
In the citing paper
“Following previous models (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Synofzik et al., 2010), disturbances in sensed agency arise not simply from predictive mismatches, but from pathologically imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of action.”
From An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2012) · cites this paper as Synofzik et al., 2010
In the citing paper
“Predictive coding models have previously been applied to the sense of agency”
From An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2012) · cites this paper as Synofzik et al., 2010
In the citing paper
“Such models propose that disturbances of sensed agency, for example in schizophrenia, arise from imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of actions”
From An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2012) · cites this paper as Synofzik et al., 2010
In the citing paper
“reduced precision of exteroceptive predictions coincides with greater delusions of control, consistent with abnormal dopaminergic neurotransmission”
From An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2012) · cites this paper as Synofzik et al., 2010
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Cites
Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion
Ernst, M. O., & Banks, M. S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415429a · Cited by 4,844
Das Reafferenzprinzip: Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie
von Holst, E., & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950) · Naturwissenschaften · doi:10.1007/bf00622503 · Cited by 2,655 · cited 2×
“Such cues could be efference copies of motor commands (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950), corollary discharge (Sperry, 1950; Crapse and Sommer, 2008a) and/or proprioceptive movement information (Bell, 2001) (for a complete discussion see Synofzik et al., 2006).”
BackgroundScale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) 1984
Andreasen, N. C. (1995) · Open Scholarship Institutional Repository (Washington University in St. Louis) · Cited by 2,423
Chlorpromazine Equivalent Doses for the Newer Atypical Antipsychotics
Woods, S. W. (2003) · The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry · doi:10.4088/jcp.v64n0607 · Cited by 2,050
Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning
Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02169 · Cited by 2,004
Merging the senses into a robust percept
Ernst, M. O., & Bülthoff, H. H. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.002 · Cited by 1,906
The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia
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Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion
Sperry, R. W. (1950) · Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055479 · Cited by 1,789 · cited 3×
“Such cues could be efference copies of motor commands (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950), corollary discharge (Sperry, 1950; Crapse and Sommer, 2008a) and/or proprioceptive movement information (Bell, 2001) (for a complete discussion see Synofzik et al.”
BackgroundPerceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2536 · Cited by 1,462
The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80 · Cited by 1,328
Cited by
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
Sense of agency in the human brain
Haggard, P. (2017) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.14 · Cited by 1,107
An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395 · Cited by 950
“Specifically, reduced precision of exteroceptive predictions coincides with greater delusions of control, consistent with abnormal dopaminergic neurotransmission (Synofzik et al., 2010; see also The Role of Dopamine).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWhat Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter?
Moore, J. W. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 · Cited by 645
Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review
Moore, J. W., & Obhi, S. S. (2012) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002 · Cited by 563
Metadata
- Authors
- Synofzik, M., Thier, P., Leube, D. T., Schlotterbeck, P., & Lindner, A.
- Affiliations
- Hertie Institute for Clinical Brain Research (DE)
- Universitätsklinikum Gießen und Marburg (DE)
- Universitätsklinikum Tübingen (DE)
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-12-07
- Volume
- 133
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 262-271
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- OpenAlex
- W2099916769
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 28 · 2012: 24
- FWCI
- 6.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Brain (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- schizophrenia, self-motion perception, efference copy, detection threshold
- MeSH terms
- Adaptation, Psychological, Adult, Female, Forecasting, Humans, Male, Photic Stimulation, Psychomotor Performance, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Sensory Thresholds, Young Adult
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are based on imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of one's actions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/brain/awp291
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- Synofzik, M., Thier, P., Leube, D. T., Schlotterbeck, P., & Lindner, A. (2010). Misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are based on imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of one's actions. Brain. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awp291
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