Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow? Revisiting Eric Raymond with bug bounty programs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Bug bounty programs offer a modern way for organizations to crowdsource their software security, and for security researchers to be fairly rewarded for the vulnerabilities they find. However, little is known on the incentives set by bug bounty programs – how they drive engagement and new bug discoveries. This article provides an empirical investigation of the strategic interactions among the managers and participants of bug bounty programs, as well as the intermediation by bug bounty platforms. We find that for a given bug bounty program, each security researcher can only expect to discover a bounded number of bugs. This result offers a validation step to a theory brought forth early on by Brady et al. This theory proposes that each security researcher inspecting a piece of software offers a unique environment of skills and mindset, which is amenable to the discovery of bugs that others may not be able to uncover. Bug bounty programs indeed benefit from the engagement of large crowds of researchers. Conversely, security researchers benefit greatly from searching for bugs in multiple bug bounty programs. However, we find that following a strong front-loading effect, newly launched programs attract researchers at the expense of older programs: the probability of finding bugs decays as ∼1/t0.4 after the launch of a program, even though bugs found later yield on average higher rewards. Our results lead us to formulate three recommendations for organizing bug bounty programs and platforms: (i) organize enrollment, mobility, and renewal of security researchers across bounty programs, (ii) highlight and organize programs for front-loading, and (iii) organize fluid market transactions to reduce uncertainty and thus reduce incentives for security researchers to sell on the black market.
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Citations
Cites
Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data
Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R., & Newman, M. E. J. (2009) · SIAM Review · doi:10.1137/070710111 · Cited by 8,019
Lakhani, K. R., & Wolf, R. G. (2003) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.443040 · Cited by 1,531
Lakhani, K. R., & Wolf, R. G. (2005) · Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5326.003.0005 · Cited by 1,530
Equity Portfolio Diversification
Goetzmann, W. N., & Kumar, A. (2008) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfn005 · Cited by 1,222 · cited 1×
“The strategy can be interpreted as portfolio diversification [54].”
Cited by
Raji, I. D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D., & Barnes, P. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3351095.3372873 · Cited by 2,245
“lgorithmic auditing has started to become similar in spirit to the well-established practice of bug bounties, where external hackers are paid for finding vulnerabilities and bugs in released software [46]. These audits, modeled after intervention strategies in information security and finance [62], have significantly…”
BackgroundRaji, I. D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D., & Barnes, P. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.00973 · Cited by 179
Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey
Huang, K., Siegel, M., & Madnick, S. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3199674 · Cited by 112
“Given the success of the bug bounty programs [69, 95, 173], where organizations reward external experts who discover vulnerabilities in their systems and patch them before they are publicly disclosed, it is very possible that deep in the dark web there will exist offensive-versions of “bug bounty programs,” where a pl…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Maillart, T., Zhao, M., Grossklags, J., & Chuang, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Cybersecurity
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-06-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 81-90
- ISSN
- 2057-2085 (ISSN-L)
- 2057-2093
- OpenAlex
- W2513442265
- Cited by
- 93
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 15.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Maillart, T., Zhao, M., Grossklags, J., & Chuang, J. (2017). Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow? Revisiting Eric Raymond with bug bounty programs. Journal of Cybersecurity. https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyx008
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