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The Dog That Did Not Bark, the Dog That Did Bark, and the Dog That Should Have Barked: A Methodology for Cyber Deterrence Research

Lupovici, Amir · 2021 · International Studies Review

Abstract

The study of deterrence presents a number of challenges, mainly to do with identifying deterrence success and defining how deterrence works. Studying cyber deterrence presents even greater challenges, as traditional deterrence challenges are exacerbated and interactions in the cyber domain create further difficulties. When studying cyber deterrence, scholars face uncertainty not only in identifying situations of deterrence success, but also—due to the secrecy surrounding cyber practices—in identifying situations of deterrence failure. Despite the many studies on cyber deterrence, methodological solutions to address these challenges still need to be developed. To this end, I suggest focusing on the adoption and employment of the strategy rather than on its success. I argue that since communicating threats is a core element of deterrence, it is easier to observe how the strategy is adopted and employed than whether it succeeds or fails. This focus provides a promising direction to study cyber deterrence and address these challenges.

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Metadata

Authors
Lupovici, A.
Affiliations
Tel Aviv University, Israel
Venue
International Studies Review
Published
2021-07-28
Volume
23
Issue
4
Pages
1672-1698
ISSN
  • 1521-9488
  • 1468-2486
Cited by
8
References
9
Language
en
Funders
Tel Aviv University (0610314581)

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Lupovici, A. (2021). The Dog That Did Not Bark, the Dog That Did Bark, and the Dog That Should Have Barked: A Methodology for Cyber Deterrence Research. International Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab032

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