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The Dog That Did Not Bark, the Dog That Did Bark, and the Dog That Should Have Barked: A Methodology for Cyber Deterrence Research
Abstract
The study of deterrence presents a number of challenges, mainly to do with identifying deterrence success and defining how deterrence works. Studying cyber deterrence presents even greater challenges, as traditional deterrence challenges are exacerbated and interactions in the cyber domain create further difficulties. When studying cyber deterrence, scholars face uncertainty not only in identifying situations of deterrence success, but also—due to the secrecy surrounding cyber practices—in identifying situations of deterrence failure. Despite the many studies on cyber deterrence, methodological solutions to address these challenges still need to be developed. To this end, I suggest focusing on the adoption and employment of the strategy rather than on its success. I argue that since communicating threats is a core element of deterrence, it is easier to observe how the strategy is adopted and employed than whether it succeeds or fails. This focus provides a promising direction to study cyber deterrence and address these challenges.
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“Memor y-political deterrentifications var y in the explicitness and timing of the threat to hurt the opponent (e.g., whether the threat is generally stated or aimed at a specific challenger; whether or not there is a clear articulation of a “red line” and a specification of punishment in the threat issued) (compare Lupovici 2021Lupovici , 1682-5)-5).”
From Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion (2023) · cites this paper as Lupovici 2021
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Cited by
Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion
Gustafsson, K., & Mälksoo, M. (2023) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqae006 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Lupovici, A.
- Affiliations
- Tel Aviv University, Israel
- Venue
- International Studies Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-07-28
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1672-1698
- ISSN
- 1521-9488
- 1468-2486
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 9
- Language
- en
- Licence
- academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model (vor)
- Funders
- Tel Aviv University (0610314581)
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