Cited by 38Advanced Malware Detection TechniquesMobile Health and mHealth ApplicationsSecurity and Verification in Computing

Analyzing security issues of android mobile health and medical applications

Open access
Tangari, Gioacchino, Ikram, Muhammad, Sentana, I Wayan Budi, Ijaz, Kiran, Kaafar, Mohamed Ali, Berkovsky, Shlomo·2021·Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association

Abstract

Objective: We conduct a first large-scale analysis of mobile health (mHealth) apps available on Google Play with the goal of providing a comprehensive view of mHealth apps’ security features and gauging the associated risks for mHealth users and their data. Materials and Methods: We designed an app collection platform that discovered and downloaded more than 20 000 mHealth apps from the Medical and Health & Fitness categories on Google Play. We performed a suite of app code and traffic measurements to highlight a range of app security flaws: certificate security, sensitive or unnecessary permission requests, malware presence, communication security, and security-related concerns raised in user reviews. Results: Compared to baseline non-mHealth apps, mHealth apps generally adopt more reliable signing mechanisms and request fewer dangerous permissions. However, significant fractions of mHealth apps expose users to serious security risks. Specifically, 1.8% of mHealth apps package suspicious codes (eg, trojans), 45.0% rely on unencrypted communication, and as much as 23.0% of personal data (eg, location information and passwords) is sent on unsecured traffic. An analysis of the app reviews reveals that mHealth app users are largely unaware of the surfaced security issues. Conclusion: Despite being better aligned with security best practices than non-mHealth apps, mHealth apps are still far from ensuring robust security guarantees. App users, clinicians, technology developers, and policy makers alike should be cognizant of the uncovered security issues and weigh them carefully against the benefits of mHealth apps.

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  • Out of 20 000 apps from Google Play studied, 45% rely on unencrypted communication, and 23% of personal data (e.g., location information and passwords) are sent on unsecured traffic.

    “For example, out of 20 000 apps from Google Play studied in [202] it was revealed that 45% of the apps rely on unencrypted communication, and as much as 23% of personal data (e.g. location information and passwords) are sent on unsecured traffic.”

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

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Authors
Tangari, G., Ikram, M., Sentana, I. W. B., Ijaz, K., Kaafar, M. A., & Berkovsky, S.
Affiliations
  • Macquarie University (AU)
  • Centre for Health Informatics, Australian Institute of Health Innovation, Macquarie
  • Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Corresponding author
Ikram, Muhammad
Venue
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Published
2021-08-12
Volume
28
Issue
10
Pages
2074-2084
ISSN
  • 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-974X
OpenAlex
W3188843181
Cited by
38
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1
FWCI
2.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Optus Macquarie University Cyber Security Hub
  • National Health and Medical Research Council (APP1134919)
  • Macquarie University
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Mobile Health and mHealth Applications
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
mobile health apps, mobile application security, Google Play Store, permission requests, malware, Trojans, sensitive data exposure, online reviews, app reviews
MeSH terms
Administrative Personnel, Communication, Humans, Exercise, Telemedicine, Mobile Applications

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