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Unaddressed privacy risks in accredited health and wellness apps: a cross-sectional systematic assessment

Open access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

BACKGROUND: Poor information privacy practices have been identified in health apps. Medical app accreditation programs offer a mechanism for assuring the quality of apps; however, little is known about their ability to control information privacy risks. We aimed to assess the extent to which already-certified apps complied with data protection principles mandated by the largest national accreditation program. METHODS: Cross-sectional, systematic, 6-month assessment of 79 apps certified as clinically safe and trustworthy by the UK NHS Health Apps Library. Protocol-based testing was used to characterize personal information collection, local-device storage and information transmission. Observed information handling practices were compared against privacy policy commitments. RESULTS: The study revealed that 89% (n = 70/79) of apps transmitted information to online services. No app encrypted personal information stored locally. Furthermore, 66% (23/35) of apps sending identifying information over the Internet did not use encryption and 20% (7/35) did not have a privacy policy. Overall, 67% (53/79) of apps had some form of privacy policy. No app collected or transmitted information that a policy explicitly stated it would not; however, 78% (38/49) of information-transmitting apps with a policy did not describe the nature of personal information included in transmissions. Four apps sent both identifying and health information without encryption. Although the study was not designed to examine data handling after transmission to online services, security problems appeared to place users at risk of data theft in two cases. CONCLUSIONS: Systematic gaps in compliance with data protection principles in accredited health apps question whether certification programs relying substantially on developer disclosures can provide a trusted resource for patients and clinicians. Accreditation programs should, as a minimum, provide consistent and reliable warnings about possible threats and, ideally, require publishers to rectify vulnerabilities before apps are released.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1186/s12916-015-0444-y

Cites

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Fig. 1 A ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack. A man-in-the-middle attack is able to intercept network traffic sent by a mobile app in a way that is invisible to users and services
Fig. 1 A ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack. A man-in-the-middle attack is able to intercept network traffic sent by a mobile app in a way that is invisible to users and servicesCC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 24 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Cohn SP. Privacy and confidentiality in the nationwide health information network. Washington: National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics; 2006.
  2. England NHS. Five year forward view. London: HM Government; 2014.
  3. Information Commissioner’s Office. Privacy notices code of practice. Wilmslow: Information Commissioner’s Office; 2010.
  4. Federal Trade Commission. Mobile privacy disclosures – building trust through transparency. USA: Federal Trade Commission; 2013.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Huckvale, K., Prieto, J. T., Tilney, M., Benghozi, P.-J., & Car, J.
Affiliations
  • Imperial College London (GB)
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
  • Nanyang Technological University (SG)
Corresponding author
  • Huckvale, Kit
  • Prieto, José Tomás
Venue
BMC Medicine
Published
2015-09-25
Volume
13
Issue
1
Pages
214-214
ISSN
1741-7015 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2120522957
Cited by
376
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 4
FWCI
139.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • BMC Medicine (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • OAR@UM (University of Malta) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DR-NTU (Nanyang Technological University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Minerva Access (University of Melbourne) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Spiral (Imperial College London) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Mobile Health and mHealth Applications
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Thoreau and American Literature
Keywords
health apps, wellness apps, data privacy, data protection, encryption, privacy policies, data transmission, personal health data, data theft, mobile application security
MeSH terms
Confidentiality, Cross-Sectional Studies, United Kingdom, Humans, National Health Programs, Software, Computer Security, Risk Assessment, Internet

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Unaddressed privacy risks in accredited health and wellness apps: a cross-sectional systematic assessment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1186/s12916-015-0444-y
The paper
Huckvale, K., Prieto, J. T., Tilney, M., Benghozi, P.-J., & Car, J. (2015). Unaddressed privacy risks in accredited health and wellness apps: a cross-sectional systematic assessment. BMC Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-015-0444-y

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.