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Blockchain distributed ledger technologies for biomedical and health care applications

Open access
Kuo, Tsung-Ting, Kim, Hyeon-Eui, Ohno-Machado, Lucila · 2017 · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association

Abstract

Objectives: To introduce blockchain technologies, including their benefits, pitfalls, and the latest applications, to the biomedical and health care domains. Target Audience: Biomedical and health care informatics researchers who would like to learn about blockchain technologies and their applications in the biomedical/health care domains. Scope: The covered topics include: (1) introduction to the famous Bitcoin crypto-currency and the underlying blockchain technology; (2) features of blockchain; (3) review of alternative blockchain technologies; (4) emerging nonfinancial distributed ledger technologies and applications; (5) benefits of blockchain for biomedical/health care applications when compared to traditional distributed databases; (6) overview of the latest biomedical/health care applications of blockchain technologies; and (7) discussion of the potential challenges and proposed solutions of adopting blockchain technologies in biomedical/health care domains.

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Cites

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Figures

Figure 1. The problem of double-spending without a central intermediary. (A) Valid transaction. (B) Double-spending (invalid) transaction. The problem illustrated in this example is: Suppose Alice has 10 coins and then sends all 10 coins to Bob. How can Bob (and other people using the coin) know that Alice has not sent the same 10 coins to Charlie before, without having a bank to verify transactions?
Figure 1. The problem of double-spending without a central intermediary. (A) Valid transaction. (B) Double-spending (invalid) transaction. The problem illustrated in this example is: Suppose Alice has 10 coins and then sends all 10 coins to Bob. How can Bob (and other people using the coin) know that Alice has not sent the same 10 coins to Charlie before, without having a bank to verify transactions?CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 2. Comparison of the distributed network topologies. (A) Centralized network topology, which creates a single-point-of-failure (the central intermediary). If the central intermediary is down or attacked, the entire network stops working. (B) Decentralized network topology, which does not contain single-point-of-failure. If one of the nodes, such as Node 1, is down or attacked, the rest of the network can still operate normally. (C) Blockchain. If “everyone can see everything” and there exists a distributed timestamp mechanism, the double-spending problem can be solved on such a decentralized network. In the example illustrated in Figure 1, if everyone (ie, Alice, Bob, Charlie, and all other people in the same network) knows that Alice (Node 1 in this example) sent 10 coins to Charlie yesterday, the transaction to send the same 10 coins to Bob today can thus be rejected through a verification process without consulting a bank.
Figure 2. Comparison of the distributed network topologies. (A) Centralized network topology, which creates a single-point-of-failure (the central intermediary). If the central intermediary is down or attacked, the entire network stops working. (B) Decentralized network topology, which does not contain single-point-of-failure. If one of the nodes, such as Node 1, is down or attacked, the rest of the network can still operate normally. (C) Blockchain. If “everyone can see everything” and there exists a distributed timestamp mechanism, the double-spending problem can be solved on such a decentralized network. In the example illustrated in Figure 1, if everyone (ie, Alice, Bob, Charlie, and all other people in the same network) knows that Alice (Node 1 in this example) sent 10 coins to Charlie yesterday, the transaction to send the same 10 coins to Bob today can thus be rejected through a verification process without consulting a bank.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 3. An example of simplified blockchain (hash-chain). Each transaction of coins is enclosed in a block. A block may contain multiple transactions and is a basic unit to be verified. Each block also contains a hash value of the previous block's header, and thus forms a hash-chain or blockchain. As all blocks are chained, the order of the blocks is deterministic; therefore, each block can serve as a timestamp of the enclosed transactions to solve the double-spending problem. Note that each node maintains a copy of the whole blockchain, thus every node can verify every transaction. For example, suppose the transaction from Alice to Charlie is enclosed in block B1 and the one from Alice to Bob is enclosed in block B2; everyone in the network can verify that B1 happened before B2 by checking the hashed blockchain, and thus the double-spend transaction from Alice to Bob should be rejected.
Figure 3. An example of simplified blockchain (hash-chain). Each transaction of coins is enclosed in a block. A block may contain multiple transactions and is a basic unit to be verified. Each block also contains a hash value of the previous block's header, and thus forms a hash-chain or blockchain. As all blocks are chained, the order of the blocks is deterministic; therefore, each block can serve as a timestamp of the enclosed transactions to solve the double-spending problem. Note that each node maintains a copy of the whole blockchain, thus every node can verify every transaction. For example, suppose the transaction from Alice to Charlie is enclosed in block B1 and the one from Alice to Bob is enclosed in block B2; everyone in the network can verify that B1 happened before B2 by checking the hashed blockchain, and thus the double-spend transaction from Alice to Bob should be rejected.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 4. An example of the nonce mechanism for the proof-of-work protocol. Each block contains an additional “nonce” (32-bit or 8-hex-digits in this example), which is a counter that serves as one of the inputs of the hashing function. To “proof” the hashing work, the nonce is incremented by one bit each time for the hash computation (ie, the “work”), until the hashed value (256-bit or 64-hex-digits in this example) contains a predefined number of leading zero bits (ie, “proof” of the work, 16-bit or 4-hex-digits in this example). Meanwhile, the newly generated unconfirmed transactions are collected in a memory pool on each node. The first node that successfully completes the proof-of-work (Node 1 at 10:14:30 in this example) has the privilege to create a new block (B2 in this example), verify the transactions, move the confirmed transactions from the memory pool to a newly created block, and add the block to the end of the longest chain (if there are competing chains). It also gets paid (eg, 12.5 bitcoins) for this work. Also, the remaining nodes (Nodes 2 and 3 in this example) stop the proof-of-work mining for B2 when Node 1 completes the proof-of-work. This way, the mining process becomes difficult (ie, one needs to compute the difficult hashing problem by trying different “nonce” values), while the checking process remains easy (ie, just one hash to see if the predefined leading bits are all zeroes). In our example, Alice cannot easily create an invalid block for her double-spend transaction, while Bob and Charlie can easily check that the block Alice created is invalid. It should be noted that the system clocks on the nodes may not be synchronized, therefore we use a global time for demonstration purposes in this example. Also note that, if an attacker modifies any of the transactions in block B1, the value of “hash of block B1's header” and thus block B2 need to be recalculated, and consequently all blocks after B1 (ie, B2 B3, B4, B5,…) also need to be recomputed. Therefore, the computational cost of attacking becomes prohibitively high.
Figure 4. An example of the nonce mechanism for the proof-of-work protocol. Each block contains an additional “nonce” (32-bit or 8-hex-digits in this example), which is a counter that serves as one of the inputs of the hashing function. To “proof” the hashing work, the nonce is incremented by one bit each time for the hash computation (ie, the “work”), until the hashed value (256-bit or 64-hex-digits in this example) contains a predefined number of leading zero bits (ie, “proof” of the work, 16-bit or 4-hex-digits in this example). Meanwhile, the newly generated unconfirmed transactions are collected in a memory pool on each node. The first node that successfully completes the proof-of-work (Node 1 at 10:14:30 in this example) has the privilege to create a new block (B2 in this example), verify the transactions, move the confirmed transactions from the memory pool to a newly created block, and add the block to the end of the longest chain (if there are competing chains). It also gets paid (eg, 12.5 bitcoins) for this work. Also, the remaining nodes (Nodes 2 and 3 in this example) stop the proof-of-work mining for B2 when Node 1 completes the proof-of-work. This way, the mining process becomes difficult (ie, one needs to compute the difficult hashing problem by trying different “nonce” values), while the checking process remains easy (ie, just one hash to see if the predefined leading bits are all zeroes). In our example, Alice cannot easily create an invalid block for her double-spend transaction, while Bob and Charlie can easily check that the block Alice created is invalid. It should be noted that the system clocks on the nodes may not be synchronized, therefore we use a global time for demonstration purposes in this example. Also note that, if an attacker modifies any of the transactions in block B1, the value of “hash of block B1's header” and thus block B2 need to be recalculated, and consequently all blocks after B1 (ie, B2 B3, B4, B5,…) also need to be recomputed. Therefore, the computational cost of attacking becomes prohibitively high.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 5. An example of how Bitcoin blockchain deals with branching chains. In this scenario, attackers create malicious blocks (M1 and M2) to compete with an honest block (H2), in an attempt to take over the honest chain (H1 and all blocks before). Assuming the computational power of honest nodes is larger than that of malicious nodes, an honest block H3 is created right after H2, before the attackers create new malicious blocks after M1 and M2. Based on the blockchain mechanism, each node first identifies a valid block based on the length of the chain, and creates a new block (N) only at the end of the longest chain (H1→H2→H3 in this example) while ignoring shorter chains (H1→M1 and H1→M2 in this example). In other words, the blockchain that has been worked on most wins the competition (ie, majority voting of “one CPU, one vote,”[1] since the longest blockchain represents the majority decision of block creators). Given that the mining process is expensive and the honest nodes have higher computational power (ie, have more CPU “voters”) than the malicious nodes, the probability for the attacker to successfully modify a block and all blocks thereafter (ie, create a malicious competing chain) is very small.
Figure 5. An example of how Bitcoin blockchain deals with branching chains. In this scenario, attackers create malicious blocks (M1 and M2) to compete with an honest block (H2), in an attempt to take over the honest chain (H1 and all blocks before). Assuming the computational power of honest nodes is larger than that of malicious nodes, an honest block H3 is created right after H2, before the attackers create new malicious blocks after M1 and M2. Based on the blockchain mechanism, each node first identifies a valid block based on the length of the chain, and creates a new block (N) only at the end of the longest chain (H1→H2→H3 in this example) while ignoring shorter chains (H1→M1 and H1→M2 in this example). In other words, the blockchain that has been worked on most wins the competition (ie, majority voting of “one CPU, one vote,”[1] since the longest blockchain represents the majority decision of block creators). Given that the mining process is expensive and the honest nodes have higher computational power (ie, have more CPU “voters”) than the malicious nodes, the probability for the attacker to successfully modify a block and all blocks thereafter (ie, create a malicious competing chain) is very small.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 6. An example of 51% attack. In this scenario, attackers create malicious blocks (M1 and M2) to compete with an honest block (H2), trying to take over the honest chain (H1 and all blocks before). However, this time the computational power of host nodes is smaller than that of malicious nodes (ie, malicious nodes control more than 51% of the computing power on the network), thus a malicious block M3 is created right after M2. Based on the blockchain mechanism, the new block (N) will be created only at the end of the longest chain (H1→ M2→M3 in this example). Therefore, the attacker has successfully modified the blockchain record (from H2 to M2) and takes over the chain by winning the majority vote.
Figure 6. An example of 51% attack. In this scenario, attackers create malicious blocks (M1 and M2) to compete with an honest block (H2), trying to take over the honest chain (H1 and all blocks before). However, this time the computational power of host nodes is smaller than that of malicious nodes (ie, malicious nodes control more than 51% of the computing power on the network), thus a malicious block M3 is created right after M2. Based on the blockchain mechanism, the new block (N) will be created only at the end of the longest chain (H1→ M2→M3 in this example). Therefore, the attacker has successfully modified the blockchain record (from H2 to M2) and takes over the chain by winning the majority vote.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 50 references

Research works printed but not linked: 28

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  5. Stevenson, 2013, Getting started with Litecoins (after Bitcoin)
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  8. Greenspan, MultiChain Private Blockchain
  9. Swan, 2015, Blockchain thinking: The brain as a dac (decentralized autonomous organization), Texas Bitcoin Conference, 27
  10. Kalodner, 2015, An empirical study of Namecoin and lessons for decentralized namespace design
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  28. Moser, Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions

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Metadata

Authors
Kuo, T.-T., Kim, H.-E., & Ohno-Machado, L.
Affiliations
  • University of California San Diego (US)
  • UCSD Health Department of Biomedical Informatics, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
Venue
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Published
2017-09-08
Volume
24
Issue
6
Pages
1211-1220
ISSN
  • 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-974X
OpenAlex
W2751179194
Cited by
1,350
References
50
Citations by year
2026: 92 · 2025: 150 · 2024: 186 · 2023: 181 · 2022: 184 · 2021: 190 · 2020: 164 · 2019: 141 · 2018: 61 · 2017: 1
FWCI
31.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health (U24AI117966, U54HL108460, IIR12-068)
  • Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (CDRN-1306-04819)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
Keywords
blockchain, distributed ledger technology, health informatics, biomedical applications, Bitcoin, cryptocurrency, distributed databases, blockchain adoption barriers
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Commerce, Confidentiality, Medical Informatics, Computer Security, Data Mining

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Kuo, T.-T., Kim, H.-E., & Ohno-Machado, L. (2017). Blockchain distributed ledger technologies for biomedical and health care applications. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocx068

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