The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dispute prevention without courts in Vietnam
Abstract
Vietnam's firms contract without the shadow of the law and only partly in the shadow of the future. Although contracting rests in part on the threat of loss of future business, firms often are willing to renegotiate following a breach, so the retaliation is not as forceful as in the standard repeated-game story and not as effective a sanction. To ensure agreements are kept, firms rely on other devices to supplement repeated-game incentives. Firms scrutinize their trading partners. Community sanctions are occasionally invoked. Transactions with greater risk of reneging are supported by more elaborate governance structures.
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Metadata
- Authors
- McMillan, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-10-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 637-658
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2074831867
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 31.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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