Brain Damage and the Moral Significance of Consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state suggest that the patients might be conscious. This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides agree that evidence for consciousness gives strong reason to preserve life. We question this assumption. We clarify the widely held but obscure principle that consciousness is morally significant. It is hard to apply this principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of notions of consciousness and that is unclear which of these is assumed by the principle. We suggest that the morally relevant notion is that of phenomenal consciousness and then use our analysis to interpret cases of brain damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral reasons not to preserve a patient's life and, indeed, that these might be stronger when patients retain significant cognitive function.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Detecting awareness in the vegetative state
Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1130197 · Cited by 1,978
Behavioural improvements with thalamic stimulation after severe traumatic brain injury
Schiff, N. D., Giacino, J. T., Kalmar, K., Victor, J. D., Baker, K., Gerber, M., Fritz, B., Eisenberg, B., O’Connor, J., Kobylarz, E. J., et al. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06041 · Cited by 1,051
Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders
Laureys, S., Owen, A. M., & Schiff, N. D. (2004) · The Lancet Neurology · doi:10.1016/s1474-4422(04)00852-x · Cited by 1,033
Cited by
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness
Niikawa, T., Hayashi, Y., Shepherd, J., & Sawai, T. (2022) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-022-09483-1 · Cited by 79
Owen, A. M. (2019) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2019.03.024 · Cited by 61
Lee, A. Y. (2023) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12421 · Cited by 57
“and Pargetter [1988], Mitchell [2006], Eddon [2013], Peacocke [2015], and Dees [2018]. As far as I can tell, none of these discussions has any straightforward implications for whether consciousness comes in degrees.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Savulescu, J., & kahane, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-02-04
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 6-26
- ISSN
- 0360-5310 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-5019
- OpenAlex
- W2158368599
- Cited by
- 129
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Savulescu, J., & kahane, G. (2009). Brain Damage and the Moral Significance of Consciousness. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhn038
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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