Degrees of consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Is a human more conscious than an octopus? In the science of consciousness, it's oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops an analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.
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Knowing whether a particular kind of entity falls within the distribution of consciousness may have an important bearing on accounts of the nature of consciousness, such as whether it is necessarily unified, comes in degrees, or is multiply realized.
“The scienti fi c importance of developing C-tests is clear, for knowing whether a particular kind of entity falls within the distribution of consciousness may have an important bearing on accounts of the nature of consciousness, such as whether it is necessarily uni fi ed [41], comes in degrees [42], or is multiply realized [43,44].”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [42]
Cites
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Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196 · see citing works
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., et al. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.10.011 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Páleník, J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Lee (2023) identifies two main lines of reasoning presented by Bayne et al. (2016a) against the gradability of consciousness: the Determinacy Objection and the Ordering Objection.”
BackgroundInfluential
- Authors
- Lee, A. Y.
- Affiliations
- University of Oslo (NO)
- Corresponding author
- Lee, Andrew Y.
- ORCID
- Lee, Andrew Y.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2022-08-04
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 553-575
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W4289755190
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 12.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Noûs (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- consciousness, theory of consciousness, animal consciousness
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