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Cited by 150Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?

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Lowe, E. J.·2012·Mind
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzs122
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Abstract

There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’.

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  • Most considered studies on causal counterfactual explanation relate to either of four theoretical milestones: Lewis-Stalnaker's theory of closest possible worlds, Pearl's Structural Causal Models, Woodward's Counterfactual Theory of Explanation, or the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model.

    “Most of the considered studies on causal counterfactual explanation relate to either of the four theoretical milestones: Lewis-Stalnaker's theory of closest possible worlds [36], [120], Pearl's Structural Causal Models (SCM) [37], Woodward's Counterfactual Theory of Explanation (CTE) [125], or the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model (NRCM) [107], [115] (see Table 5).”

    From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [125]

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Authors
Lowe, E. J.
Affiliations
Durham University (GB)
Corresponding author
Lowe, E. J.
Venue
Mind
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2012-10-01
Volume
121
Issue
484
Pages
919-950
ISSN
  • 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-2113
DOI
10.1093/mind/fzs122
OpenAlex
W2029395614
Cited by
150
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1
FWCI
22.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Mind (publishedVersion)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
modal knowledge, epistemology of modality, counterfactuals, Timothy Williamson, Kit Fine, essence, real definition, metaphysical necessity, metaphysical possibility, conceivability

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