The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?
Open accessAbstract
There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Most of the considered studies on causal counterfactual explanation relate to either of the four theoretical milestones: Lewis-Stalnaker's theory of closest possible worlds [36], [120], Pearl's Structural Causal Models (SCM) [37], Woodward's Counterfactual Theory of Explanation (CTE) [125], or the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model (NRCM) [107], [115] (see Table 5).”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [125]
Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Parfit, D. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 · Cited by 5,803
Williamson, T. L. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,283
Suits, B. (1978) · University of Toronto Press eBooks · doi:10.3138/9781487574338 · Cited by 1,560
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Bach, K., & Fodor, J. A. (2000) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2693638 · Cited by 936
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Chalmers, D. J. (2002) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.003.0004 · Cited by 893
Merricks, T. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199245363.001.0001 · Cited by 824
Causal and Metaphysical Necessity
Shoemaker, S. (1998) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00050 · Cited by 438
Review: Conceivability and Possibility
Divers, J. (2004) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/113.450.347 · Cited by 277
(1998) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1017159501073 · Cited by 229
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 2006, DIALECTICA, 61, 63
- 2011, NOS, 45, 22
- 2007, Mind, 115, 659
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–150 of 150
TEM and the Theoretical Virtues
Fischer, B. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1_7
Modal Thought and Modal Knowledge
Ramshaw, P. A. (2016) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York)
Propositions : an ontological inquiry
Lin, H.-C. (2017) · Birkbeck Institutional Research Online (BiRO) - Theses · doi:10.18743/pub.00040296
Analytic Essentialist Approaches to the Epistemology of Modality
Vaidya, A. J. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792161.003.0011
Essence, Explanation, and Modal Knowledge
Mallozzi, A. (2018) · CUNY Academic Works (City University of New York)
Vikingism as a Metametaphysical Thesis
Livanios, V. (2019) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12370
Visser, R. P. (2019) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p323
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0006
Observation and Indispensability
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0004
Genealogical Debunking Arguments
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0005
Self-Evidence, Proof, and Disagreement
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0003
Realism, Ontology, and Objectivity
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0002
O’Conaill, D. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01665-6
“Another way Goff defends TCP is by appealing to the programme of essentialism, which aims to explain modal truths in terms of truths concerning essences (Fine, 1994; Lowe, 2012).”
BackgroundNon-uniformism and the Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting Modal Claims
Wirling, Y. S. (2021) · Grazer Philosophische Studien · doi:10.1163/18756735-00000146
“Traditional modal epistemologies – e.g. conceivability theories (Yablo 1993, Chalmers 2002), modal intuitionism (Bealer 2002), and certain essence-based modal epistemologies (Lowe 2012, Hale 2013) – were rationalist in nature.”
BackgroundColeman, S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.015
On Williamson’s Armchair Philosophical Knowledge
Wang, C., & Wang, W.-F. (2022) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-022-00908-1
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0008
A Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality
Fischer, B. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1_1
Coleman, S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.016
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.003.0001
Abath, A. J. (2022) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-07365-6_1
Abath, A. J. (2022) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-07365-6_4
Relational Troubles Structuralist Worries for an Epistemology of Powers-Based Modality
Giannini, G., & Schoonen, T. (2022) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqac084
Against the epistemology of essence
Wildman, N. (2023) · Collège de France eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.cdf.13831
Connaissance philosophique, connaissance des essences : où en sommes-nous ?
Tiercelin, C. (2023) · Collège de France eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.cdf.13751
La nécessité sans l’essence : le problème de la distinction numérique
Contim, F. D. V. (2023) · Collège de France eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.cdf.13824
Jago, M. T. (2023) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02005-6
“Lowe (2012), Hale (2013), and Jago (2021b) defend a view like this.”
Husserl on knowing essences: Transworld identity and epistemic progression
Butler, A. P. (2024) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12936
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.002.0004
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.002.0003
Powered properties, modal continuity, and the patchwork principle
Dagher, I. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04696-8
“Authors have proposed that we can develop guides for what is possible by appealing to conceivability (Yablo, 1993), counterfactuals (Williamson, 2007), essences (Lowe, 2012 ), and patchwork, or cut-and-paste, principles (Lewis, 1986).”
Through the Prism of Modal Epistemology
Wirling, Y. S., & Grüne‐Yanoff, T. (2025) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003342816-3
Knowing What Truth Is: Some Brief Remarks on the Erotetic Account
Cardoso, G. (2025) · Manuscrito · doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2025.v48n2.gc
Encinas, M. J. G. (2025) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-025-00820-1
Précis of Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry Based-Approach
Abath, A. J. (2025) · Manuscrito · doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2025.v48n2.aa
Erotetic Knowledge and Deal-Breaker Propositions
Campos, V. (2025) · Manuscrito · doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2025.v48n2.vc
Modal Logic and Modal Metaphysics: An Avicennian Division of Labour
Kaukua, J. (2025) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/theo.70034
Roman Ingarden’s Concept of Essence: A Non-Entity View
Liu, C. (2025) · Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology · doi:10.1080/00071773.2025.2579941
Platonism, Property Essentialism, and the Reduction of Modality To Essence
Butler, A. P. (2025) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-025-01051-2
“NE is a canonical doctrine assumed by Fine (1995 ) and most proponents of Finean essentialism (cf. Fine, 1995; Correia & Skiles, 2019 ; Wallner, 2019; van Cleve, 2018; Hale, 2018 , 2013 ; Kment, 2014; Lowe, 2012).”
Vogt, L. (2026) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7
“1 3 case of full real definition, the definition tells us what the essence bearer is in full, while in the case of partial definition, it tells us merely what the essence bearer is in part (Dasgupta, 2015; Lowe, 2012 ).”
Rooney, J. D. (2026) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009453707.003
What Is an Inquiry into the Nature of Law? A Debate on Raz's Metaphysical Approach
Redondo, M. C. (2026) · Ratio Juris · doi:10.1111/raju.70016
Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori
Melis, G., Merlo, G., & Wright, C. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780191997341.003.0001
Casullo, A. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780191997341.003.0010
Knowledge, scientifi c knowledge and objectivity
Golovko, N. V. (2026) · Siberian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.25205/2541-7517-2025-23-4-37-112
Experimentos Mentales y Racionalismo Modal: una evaluación crítica del enfoque de Chalmers
Lara, L. A. M. (2026) · Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía · doi:10.30827/trif.36713
“En esta línea, se han presentado diversas propuestas sobre cómo obtenemos conocimiento de esencias y cómo pasamos de este al conoci-miento modal (Hale, 2013; Kment, 2021; Lowe, 2012).”
Dispositions, bundles, and objectual essences
Amar, J. (2026) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqag077
Metadata
- Authors
- Lowe, E. J.
- Affiliations
- Durham University (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Lowe, E. J.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-10-01
- Volume
- 121
- Issue
- 484
- Pages
- 919-950
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2029395614
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 22.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- modal knowledge, epistemology of modality, counterfactuals, Timothy Williamson, Kit Fine, essence, real definition, metaphysical necessity, metaphysical possibility, conceivability
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
