More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2): More of P!Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!
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Cites
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Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
The root of all value: a neural common currency for choice
Levy, D. J., & Glimcher, P. W. (2012) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2012.06.001 · Cited by 1,342
Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2005) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00355.x · Cited by 1,064 · cited 1×
“outcome will give us the greatest pleasure/the least dis-pleasure (Gilbert and Wilson 2005).”
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236979.001.0001 · Cited by 993
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945
A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure
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Cited by
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Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
The value of consciousness: experiences worth having
Moncoucy, L., Dołęga, K., Tallon-Baudry, C., & Cleeremans, A. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0303 · Cited by 6
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Barlassina, L., & Hayward, M. K.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2019-07-06
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 512
- Pages
- 1013-1044
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2943235357
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 4.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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