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Importance, limits and caveats of the use of “disorders of consciousness” to theorize consciousness

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 122 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The clinical and fundamental exploration of patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DoC) is commonly used by researchers both to test some of their key theoretical predictions and to serve as a unique source of empirical knowledge about possible dissociations between consciousness and cognitive and/or neural processes. For instance, the existence of states of vigilance free of any self-reportable subjective experience [e.g. “vegetative state (VS)” and “complex partial epileptic seizure”] originated from DoC and acted as a cornerstone for all theories by dissociating two concepts that were commonly equated and confused: vigilance and conscious state. In the present article, we first expose briefly the major achievements in the exploration and understanding of DoC. We then propose a synthetic taxonomy of DoC, and we finally highlight some current limits, caveats and questions that have to be addressed when using DoC to theorize consciousness. In particular, we show (i) that a purely behavioral approach of DoC is insufficient to characterize the conscious state of patients; (ii) that the comparison between patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) and patients in a VS [also coined as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)] does not correspond to a pure and minimal contrast between unconscious and conscious states and (iii) we emphasize, in the light of original resting-state positron emission tomography data, that behavioral MCS captures an important but misnamed clinical condition that rather corresponds to a cortically mediated state and that MCS does not necessarily imply the preservation of a conscious state.

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Crossref · 10.1093/nc/niab048

Cites

122 of 122 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Figures

Figure 1. FDG-PET regional discrimination performance
Figure 1. FDG-PET regional discrimination performanceCC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 2. Metabolic correlates of CRS-R MCS items
Figure 2. Metabolic correlates of CRS-R MCS itemsCC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 3. Schematic timeline of the syndromic taxonomy of disorders of consciousness
Figure 3. Schematic timeline of the syndromic taxonomy of disorders of consciousnessCC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 4. Comparison of the polymorph terminology of disorder of consciousness
Figure 4. Comparison of the polymorph terminology of disorder of consciousnessCC BY-NC · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 122 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Laureys, 2004, Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders, Lancet Neurol, 3, 537, 10.1016/s1474-4422(04)00852-x · DOI · Paper page
  2. Stender, 2014, Diagnostic precision of PET imaging and functional MRI in disorders of consciousness: a clinical validation study, Lancet, 384, 514, 10.1016/s0140-6736(14)60042-8 · DOI · Paper page

Cited by

  • Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond

    Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198

    “…when consciousness fi rst emerges in human development [1 – 6]; when it is retained (or regained) in the context of disorders of consciousness [7 – 9], such as the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) (see Glossary) or the minimally conscious state , or in epileptic seizures [10 – 12]; and the…”
    Background
  • Brain-heart interactions in the neurobiology of consciousness

    Candia‐Rivera, D. (2022) · Current Research in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100050 · Cited by 122

  • Measures and Models of Brain-Heart Interactions

    Candia‐Rivera, D., Faes, L., Fallani, F. D. V., & Chávez, M. (2025) · IEEE Reviews in Biomedical Engineering · doi:10.1109/rbme.2025.3529363 · Cited by 42

    “In doing this, we highlighted the key methodological challenges in current approaches to measuring and modeling brain-heart interactions.”
  • Covert consciousness

    Young, M. J., Edlow, B. L., & Bodien, Y. G. (2024) · Neurorehabilitation · doi:10.3233/nre-230123 · Cited by 41

    “…can be justifi-M ably considered covertly conscious as, ex hypothesi, they are not ‘ minimally conscious’ but rather are fully conscious with impaired behavioral repertoire (i.e., minimally responsive but not minimally conscious) (Bernat, 2002; de Jong, 2013; Hermann, Sangar´e, et al., 2021).”
  • Covert cortical processing: a diagnosis in search of a definition

    Young, M. J., Fecchio, M., Bodien, Y. G., & Edlow, B. L. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad026 · Cited by 29

    “Despite these conceptual shortcomings, expounded upon by philoso-phers and clinicians alike, (Bayne et al. 2018, L Naccache 2018, Lazaridis 2019, Hermann et al. 2021), prevailing clinical nomenclature has remained largely unchanged, (Choi and Young 2023, Golden et al. 2023) with some rebutting the…”
    Background

See all 31

Metadata

Authors
Hermann, B., Sangaré, A., Munoz-Musat, E., Salah, A. B., Perez, P., Valente, M., Faugeras, F., Axelrod, V., Demeret, S., Marois, C., Pyatigorskaya, N., Habert, M.-O., Kas, A., Sitt, J. D., Rohaut, B., & Naccache, L.
Affiliations
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
  • Brain institute-ICM, Inserm U1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Sorbonne Université, Paris 75013, France
  • Inserm (FR)
  • Bar-Ilan University (IL)
  • Sorbonne Université (FR)
Corresponding author
Naccache, Lionel
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2021-12-01
Volume
2021
Issue
2
Pages
niab048-niab048
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4226047631
Cited by
24
References
122
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 3
FWCI
0.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • ‘Bourse poste d’Accueil’ grant from ‘Inserm’
  • ‘FRM Equipe 2015’
  • UNIM
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Clinical Neurology › Traumatic Brain Injury Research
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
disorders of consciousness, theory of consciousness, minimally conscious state, vegetative state, complex partial epilepsy, sustained attention, subjective experience, resting-state fMRI

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Importance, limits and caveats of the use of “disorders of consciousness” to theorize consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/nc/niab048
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Hermann, B., Sangaré, A., Munoz-Musat, E., Salah, A. B., Perez, P., Valente, M., Faugeras, F., Axelrod, V., Demeret, S., Marois, C., Pyatigorskaya, N., Habert, M.-O., Kas, A., Sitt, J. D., Rohaut, B., & Naccache, L. (2021). Importance, limits and caveats of the use of “disorders of consciousness” to theorize consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab048

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