Importance, limits and caveats of the use of “disorders of consciousness” to theorize consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 122 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The clinical and fundamental exploration of patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DoC) is commonly used by researchers both to test some of their key theoretical predictions and to serve as a unique source of empirical knowledge about possible dissociations between consciousness and cognitive and/or neural processes. For instance, the existence of states of vigilance free of any self-reportable subjective experience [e.g. “vegetative state (VS)” and “complex partial epileptic seizure”] originated from DoC and acted as a cornerstone for all theories by dissociating two concepts that were commonly equated and confused: vigilance and conscious state. In the present article, we first expose briefly the major achievements in the exploration and understanding of DoC. We then propose a synthetic taxonomy of DoC, and we finally highlight some current limits, caveats and questions that have to be addressed when using DoC to theorize consciousness. In particular, we show (i) that a purely behavioral approach of DoC is insufficient to characterize the conscious state of patients; (ii) that the comparison between patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) and patients in a VS [also coined as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)] does not correspond to a pure and minimal contrast between unconscious and conscious states and (iii) we emphasize, in the light of original resting-state positron emission tomography data, that behavioral MCS captures an important but misnamed clinical condition that rather corresponds to a cortically mediated state and that MCS does not necessarily imply the preservation of a conscious state.
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“Beyond that consensus, however, lies signi fi cant disagreement about the distribution of consciousness.”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
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“when it is retained (or regained) in the context of disorders of consciousness [7 -9], such as the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) (see Glossary) or the minimally conscious state”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
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Tzourio-Mazoyer, N., Landeau, B., Papathanassiou, D., Crivello, F., Etard, O., Delcroix, N., Mazoyer, B., & Joliot, M. (2002) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0978 · Cited by 16,319 · cited 1×
“We first investigated whether a classification based on regional metabolism would outperform the MIBH (which measures the hemispheric cortical average) by extracting the average metabolic index values for each patient within 41 cortical regions (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002) and contrasting the VS/UWS from MCS.”
MethodOn a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 2×
“However this definition departs from other theories such as phenomenal consciousness theory (Block 1995), microconsciousness theory (Zeki and Bartels 1999) or local-recurrent consciousness theory (Lamme 2006).”
BackgroundTowards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498
The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria
Giacino, J. T., Ashwal, S., Childs, N., Cranford, R., Jennett, B., Katz, D. I., Kelly, J. P., Rosenberg, J. H., Whyte, J., Zafonte, R. D., et al. (2002) · Neurology · doi:10.1212/wnl.58.3.349 · Cited by 2,422
Detecting awareness in the vegetative state
Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1130197 · Cited by 1,978 · cited 1×
“SMA vs parahippocampal place area, posterior parietal cortex and premotor cortex respectively) in a manner indistinguishable from that of healthy volunteers engaged in the same task (Owen et al. 2006).”
ResultGiacino, J. T., Kalmar, K., & Whyte, J. (2004) · Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation · doi:10.1016/j.apmr.2004.02.033 · Cited by 1,874
Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness
Monti, M. M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Pickard, J. D., Tshibanda, L., Owen, A. M., & Laureys, S. (2010) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmoa0905370 · Cited by 1,461 · cited 9×
“Crucially, the interpretation of all fMRI, quantitative EEG, PET imaging, TMS-EEG and other brain activity or behavioral measures used to contrast VS/UWS with MCS relies on this premise.”
InfluentialSchnakers, C., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Giacino, J., Ventura, M., Boly, M., Majerus, S., Moonen, G., & Laureys, S. (2009) · BMC Neurology · doi:10.1186/1471-2377-9-35 · Cited by 1,348 · cited 1×
“The frequency of misdiagnoses of DOC patients by clinical consensus compared to behavior-scale assessments is up to 40% in VW/UWS (Childs et al. 1993; Schnakers et al. 2009; Stender et al. 2014b; Wang et al. 2020).”
Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome: a new name for the vegetative state or apallic syndrome
the European Task Force on Disorders of Consciousness, Laureys, S., Celesia, G. G., Cohadon, F., Lavrijsen, J., León-Carrión, J., Sannita, W. G., Sazbon, L., Schmutzhard, E., von Wild, K. R., et al. (2010) · BMC Medicine · doi:10.1186/1741-7015-8-68 · Cited by 1,281 · cited 1×
“Also, a new denomination has been proposed, the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), mainly because of the perceived pejorative connotation associated with the word vegetative in the public opinion (Laureys et al. 2010).”
BackgroundPERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE AFTER BRAIN DAMAGE
Jennett, B., & Plum, F. (1972) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(72)90242-5 · Cited by 1,227
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Laureys, 2004, Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders, Lancet Neurol, 3, 537, 10.1016/s1474-4422(04)00852-x · DOI · Paper page
- Stender, 2014, Diagnostic precision of PET imaging and functional MRI in disorders of consciousness: a clinical validation study, Lancet, 384, 514, 10.1016/s0140-6736(14)60042-8 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
“…when consciousness fi rst emerges in human development [1 – 6]; when it is retained (or regained) in the context of disorders of consciousness [7 – 9], such as the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) (see Glossary) or the minimally conscious state , or in epileptic seizures [10 – 12]; and the…”
BackgroundBrain-heart interactions in the neurobiology of consciousness
Candia‐Rivera, D. (2022) · Current Research in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100050 · Cited by 122
Measures and Models of Brain-Heart Interactions
Candia‐Rivera, D., Faes, L., Fallani, F. D. V., & Chávez, M. (2025) · IEEE Reviews in Biomedical Engineering · doi:10.1109/rbme.2025.3529363 · Cited by 42
“In doing this, we highlighted the key methodological challenges in current approaches to measuring and modeling brain-heart interactions.”
Young, M. J., Edlow, B. L., & Bodien, Y. G. (2024) · Neurorehabilitation · doi:10.3233/nre-230123 · Cited by 41
“…can be justifi-M ably considered covertly conscious as, ex hypothesi, they are not ‘ minimally conscious’ but rather are fully conscious with impaired behavioral repertoire (i.e., minimally responsive but not minimally conscious) (Bernat, 2002; de Jong, 2013; Hermann, Sangar´e, et al., 2021).”
Covert cortical processing: a diagnosis in search of a definition
Young, M. J., Fecchio, M., Bodien, Y. G., & Edlow, B. L. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad026 · Cited by 29
“Despite these conceptual shortcomings, expounded upon by philoso-phers and clinicians alike, (Bayne et al. 2018, L Naccache 2018, Lazaridis 2019, Hermann et al. 2021), prevailing clinical nomenclature has remained largely unchanged, (Choi and Young 2023, Golden et al. 2023) with some rebutting the…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hermann, B., Sangaré, A., Munoz-Musat, E., Salah, A. B., Perez, P., Valente, M., Faugeras, F., Axelrod, V., Demeret, S., Marois, C., Pyatigorskaya, N., Habert, M.-O., Kas, A., Sitt, J. D., Rohaut, B., & Naccache, L.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Brain institute-ICM, Inserm U1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Sorbonne Université, Paris 75013, France
- Inserm (FR)
- Bar-Ilan University (IL)
- Sorbonne Université (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Naccache, Lionel
- ORCID
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-12-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab048-niab048
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8966966
- OpenAlex
- W4226047631
- Cited by
- 24
- References
- 122
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 3
- FWCI
- 0.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- ‘Bourse poste d’Accueil’ grant from ‘Inserm’
- ‘FRM Equipe 2015’
- UNIM
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Clinical Neurology › Traumatic Brain Injury Research
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- disorders of consciousness, theory of consciousness, minimally conscious state, vegetative state, complex partial epilepsy, sustained attention, subjective experience, resting-state fMRI
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- Hermann, B., Sangaré, A., Munoz-Musat, E., Salah, A. B., Perez, P., Valente, M., Faugeras, F., Axelrod, V., Demeret, S., Marois, C., Pyatigorskaya, N., Habert, M.-O., Kas, A., Sitt, J. D., Rohaut, B., & Naccache, L. (2021). Importance, limits and caveats of the use of “disorders of consciousness” to theorize consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab048
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