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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 18 of the 46 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience

Open access
Letheby, Chris, Gerrans, Philip · 2017 · Neuroscience of Consciousness

Abstract

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or 'I' distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such 'ego dissolution' experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the 'integrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that psychedelic “ego dissolution” reveals the self to be a predictive, integrative model rather than a real substance or entity. It uses the phenomenology and neuroscience of psychedelics to claim that when self-binding processes break down, the apparent unity of the self also breaks down.

## Key findings

  • Ego dissolution is presented as evidence that self-awareness depends on hierarchical predictive models that bind information into a unified self-model; the paper argues this model is a “useful Cartesian fiction” and that “the self does not exist.”
  • The paper links psychedelic ego dissolution to reduced integrity of self-related brain networks: intravenous psilocybin reduced BOLD signal mainly in the DMN, diminished coupling between the MPFC and PCC, and reduced PCC alpha power correlated strongly with ego-dissolution ratings.
  • It also cites findings that ego dissolution correlated with disintegration of the SLN (Lebedev et al. 2015) and with increased global functional connectivity plus breakdown of resting-state networks under LSD (Tagliazucchi et al. 2016), supporting the idea that different aspects of self-representation can be disrupted.
  • The paper argues ego dissolution is not all-or-nothing: changes may begin with bodily self-feeling and later affect ownership of thoughts, and some self-awareness is often preserved.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical paper: it synthesizes prior work on binding, predictive processing, self-binding, and psychedelic phenomenology rather than reporting a new experiment.
  • Evidence base: it reviews previously published human studies of psychedelics and self-related brain function, including fMRI, MEG, and related neuroimaging findings on psilocybin, ayahuasca, and LSD.
  • Main analysis: it interprets these findings through a predictive-processing account, arguing that ego dissolution reflects disruption of self-binding in DMN and SLN-related processes.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that psychedelic ego-dissolution research is hampered by variability and alleged ineffability of the experiences, and that current measures are limited; it notes that the ego dissolution inventory “does not make such discriminations.”
  • It also notes that some findings have not replicated across all psychedelic fMRI studies.
  • Evident from the text: this is a theoretical review and interpretation, not a new empirical test of the authors’ claims.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/nc/nix016

Cites

66 of 66 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

15 Valid · 4 Not valid · 23 Not checked · 80 Own results and interpretations

65 more claims · 6 with their cited sources checked

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 30
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 28

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Citations

Cites

Show all 70 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Dennett, 1991, Consciousness Explained
  2. Hohwy, 2017, The Subject's Matter
  3. Kingsland, 2016, Siddhartha’s Brain: The Science of Meditation, Mindfulness and Enlightenment

Cited by

See all 293

Metadata

Authors
Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P.
Affiliations
The University of Adelaide (AU)
Corresponding author
  • Letheby, Chris
  • Gerrans, Philip
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2017-01-01
Volume
2017
Issue
1
Pages
nix016-nix016
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2726898022
Cited by
293
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 68 · 2024: 56 · 2023: 60 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3
FWCI
12.89
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Australian Government
  • Australian Research Council (FT110101050)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Psychedelics and Drug Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
ego dissolution, psychedelic experience, self-awareness, self-model, predictive processing, self-binding, binding problem, nature of the self

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/nc/nix016
The paper
Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/nix016

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.