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Looking for the self: phenomenology, neurophysiology and philosophical significance of drug-induced ego dissolution.

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Millière, Raphaël·2017·Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
DOI 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245PMC PMC5441112
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Abstract

There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as "drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)", for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the "minimal" or "embodied" self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED.

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  • Inference about precision may itself be compromised and produce abnormal experiences in derealization or depersonalization or altered states of consciousness.

    “In more dramatic cases, inference about precision may itself be compromised and produce abnormal experiences; e.g., in derealization or depersonalization (cf. Metzinger, 2003; Seth et al., 2012) or altered states of consciousness (Millière, 2017).”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Millière, 2017

    In “DIED and Computational Models of Minimal Selfhood” (page not provided), Millière discusses the possibility that under-constrained generative models in psychedelic states produce suboptimal predictions and unusual subjective effects. This supports a possible link between disrupted prediction and altered states, but the passage does not specifically say that inference about precision is compromised. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Authors
Millière, R.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Millière, Raphaël
ORCID
Millière, Raphaël
Venue
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2017-05-23
Volume
11
Pages
245-245
ISSN
1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245
PMC
PMC5441112
OpenAlex
W2618615166
Cited by
206
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 2
FWCI
14.59
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
University of Oxford
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Psychedelics and Drug Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
dissolution of the self, hallucinogens, classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics, kappa opioid receptor agonists, embodied self, minimal self, self-awareness, consciousness, psychosis, multisensory integration, philosophy of mind

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