The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Kleptocracy and revolutions
Abstract
This paper develops an economic theory of revolutions as manifestations of kleptocratic rivalry. The theory implies that whether or not a revolution occurs and, if a revolution occurs, the probability that it will be successful depends on the current realizations of the stochastic factors, such as the current potential revolutionary leader's skill in organizing a revolution, that determine the expected effectiveness of insurgents relative to the ruler's soldiers. But, the theory also implies that, given the current realization of the expected effectiveness of insurgents, more is spent on deterring revolutions that do not occur, and revolutions when they occur consume more resources, the larger is the value of being the kleptocratic ruler. Unsurprisingly, some of those who suffered for the cause, in exile or underground, now feel they deserve their just rewards: good salaries, nice cars, patronage, and perks. (Timothy Garton Ash, 'The Curse and Blessing of South Africa', The New York Review of Books, August 14, 1997, page 10.)
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Citations
Cites
A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections
Grossman, H. I. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 808
Self-citationHirshleifer, J. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261974 · Cited by 669
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/601453 · Cited by 620
Self-citationHirshleifer, J. (1991) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00046.x · Cited by 505
Tullock, G. (1974) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 463
The analytics of continuing conflict
Hirshleifer, J. (1988) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00869589 · Cited by 332
(2005) · Australian Economic History Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8446.2005.00145.x · Cited by 271
Powell, R. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938960 · Cited by 261
Production, appropriation, and land reform
Grossman, H. I. (1994) · American Economic Review · Cited by 209
Self-citationGrossman, H. I. (1992) · Defence Economics · doi:10.1080/10430719208404737 · Cited by 159
Self-citationGrossman, H., & Kim, M. (1995) · doi:10.3386/w5357 · Cited by 154
Self-citationCan the shadow of the future harm cooperation?
Skaperdas, S., & Syropoulos, C. A. (1996) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00077-1 · Cited by 134
Proprietary public finance and economic welfare
Grossman, H. I., & Noh, S. J. (1994) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)90020-5 · Cited by 116
Self-citationRobin hood and the redistribution of property income
Grossman, H. I. (1995) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(94)00062-o · Cited by 100
Self-citationGrossman, H. I., & Kim, M. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619984.004 · Cited by 64
Self-citation
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Greed and grievance in civil war
Collier, P. (2004) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064 · Cited by 6,101
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS
GANDHI, J., & PRZEWORSKI, A. (2006) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x · Cited by 979
Greed and Grievance in Civil War
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2355 · Cited by 815
“New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?
Kalyvas, S. N. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0022 · Cited by 646
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, H.
- Venue
- Oxford Economic Papers
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-04-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 267-283
- ISSN
- 0030-7653 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3812
- OpenAlex
- W1974511229
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 29.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.