The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS
Abstract
Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996.
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Cites
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Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
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Self-citationRoss, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409
A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality
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Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Self-citationDemocracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America
Chakravarty, S. P., & Przeworski, A. (1992) · Bulletin of Latin American Research · doi:10.2307/3338135 · Cited by 2,181
Self-citationEthnic and Cultural Diversity by Country*
Fearon, J. D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024419522867 · Cited by 1,829
Democracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures
Przeworski, A., Álvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · Cited by 1,686
Self-citationDependency and Development in Latin America
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Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation
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Cited by
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
Self-citationCredible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule
Magaloni, B. (2008) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007313124 · Cited by 1,121
The three pillars of stability: Legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes
Gerschewski, J. (2013) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738860 · Cited by 1,053
Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment
Wright, J. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00315.x · Cited by 708
Metadata
- Authors
- GANDHI, J., & PRZEWORSKI, A.
- Venue
- Economics and Politics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0343
- OpenAlex
- W2086651280
- Cited by
- 979
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 62.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- GANDHI, J., & PRZEWORSKI, A. (2006). COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS. Economics and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
