The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
“Learning by Thinking” in Science and in Everyday Life
Abstract
This chapter introduces “learning by thinking” (LbT) as a form of learning distinct from familiar forms of learning through observation. When learning by thinking, the learner gains genuinely new insight in the absence of novel observations “outside the head.” Scientific thought experiments are canonical examples, but the phenomenon is much more widespread, and includes learning by explaining to oneself, through analogical reasoning, or through mental simulation. The chapter argues that episodes of LbT can be re-expressed as explicit arguments or inferences but are neither psychologically nor epistemically reducible to explicit arguments or inferences, and that this partially explains the novelty of the conclusions reached through LbT. It also introduces a new perspective on the epistemic value of LbT processes as practices with potentially beneficial epistemic consequences, even when the commitments they invoke and the conclusions they immediately deliver are not themselves true.
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“Prior work has also found that verbal thinking can be less accurate than visual or motor simulation (Schwartz & Black 1999; see also Aronowitz & Lombrozo 2020;Lombrozo 2019)”
From Mind Your Step (by Step): Chain-of-Thought can Reduce Performance on Tasks where Thinking Makes Humans Worse (2024) · cites this paper as Lombrozo 2019
Citations
Cites
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Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
The Inference to the Best Explanation
Harman, G. H. (1965) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183532 · Cited by 1,798
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Eliciting Self‐Explanations Improves Understanding
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Simulation and similarity: using models to understand the world
(2013) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.51-0251 · Cited by 630
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Research works printed but not linked: 6
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- Fonseca, B. A., and Chi, M. T. (2011). “Instruction Based on Self-Explanation.” Handbook of Research on Learning and Instruction, edited by R. E. Mayer and P. A. Alexander, 296‒321. New York: Routledge.
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Cited by
Liu, R., Geng, J., Wu, A. J., Sucholutsky, I., Lombrozo, T., & Griffiths, T. L. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2410.21333 · Cited by 6
“We test these predictions using the selected study paradigms in Section 4.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lombrozo, T.
- Venue
- The Scientific Imagination
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2020-01-30
- Pages
- 230-249
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 49
- Language
- en
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