Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Can humans and artificial intelligences share concepts and communicate? One aim of Making AI Intelligible is to show that philosophical work on the metaphysics of meaning can help answer these questions. Cappelen and Dever use the externalist tradition in philosophy of to create models of how AIs and humans can understand each other. In doing so, they also show ways in which that philosophical tradition can be improved: our linguistic encounters with AIs revel that our theories of meaning have been excessively anthropocentric. The questions addressed in the book are not only theoretically interesting, but the answers have pressing practical implications. Many important decisions about human life are now influenced by AI. In giving that power to AI, we presuppose that AIs can track features of the world that we care about (e.g. creditworthiness, recidivism, cancer, and combatants.) If AIs can share our concepts, that will go some way towards justifying this reliance on AI. The book can be read as a proposal for how to take some first steps towards achieving interpretable AI. Making AI Intelligible is of interest to both philosophers of language and anyone who follows current events or interacts with AI systems. It illustrates how philosophy can help us understand and improve our interactions with AI.
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Cites
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
Peeking Inside the Black-Box: A Survey on Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
Adadi, A., & Berrada, M. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2870052 · Cited by 6,294
Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences
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Floridi, L., Cowls, J., Beltrametti, M., Chatila, R., Chazerand, P., Dignum, V., Luetge, C., Madelin, R., Pagallo, U., Rossi, F., et al. (2018) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5 · Cited by 4,774
Towards A Rigorous Science of Interpretable Machine Learning
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Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies
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Generating Visual Explanations
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Empiricism without magic: transformational abstraction in deep convolutional neural networks
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Cited by
Schepman, A., & Rodway, P. (2023) · International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction · doi:10.1080/10447318.2022.2085400 · Cited by 503
AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy
Vaassen, B. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00577-5 · Cited by 94
“8Lipton (2018) and Cappelen and Dever (2021) make similar points in passing. fully understood by patients, practitioners or researchers.”
InfluentialDo Language Models’ Words Refer?
Mandelkern, M., & Linzen, T. (2024) · Computational Linguistics · doi:10.1162/coli_a_00522 · Cited by 77
Coelho Mollo, D., & Millière, R. (2026) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2026.12307 · Cited by 48
Meaning by Courtesy: LLM-Generated Texts and the Illusion of Content
Ostertag, G. (2023) · The American Journal of Bioethics · doi:10.1080/15265161.2023.2249851 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Cappelen, H., & Dever, J.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2021-04-22
- OpenAlex
- W4248419300
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.86
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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