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Reasonable Religious Disagreements
Abstract
A few years ago I co-taught a course called “Rationality, Relativism, and Religion” to undergraduates majoring in either philosophy or religion. Many of the students, especially the religion majors, displayed a pleasantly tolerant attitude. Although a wide variety of different religious views were represented in the class, and the students disagreed with one another about many religious issues, almost all the students had a great deal of respect for the views of the others. They “agreed to disagree” and concluded that “reasonable people can disagree” about the issues under discussion. In large part, the point of this essay is to explore exactly what this respectful and tolerant attitude can sensibly amount to. The issue to be discussed is a general one, applying to disagreements in many areas other than religion. However, I will focus here on religious disagreement.
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Citations
Cited by
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Christensen, D. (2009) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x · Cited by 431
Educating for Intellectual Humility and Conviction
Pritchard, D. (2020) · Journal of Philosophy of Education · doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12422 · Cited by 67
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements
Lougheed, K. (2018) · Informal Logic · doi:10.22329/il.v38i2.4966 · Cited by 11
Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement
Aslantatar, N. (2025) · İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi · doi:10.29288/ilted.1657637 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Feldman, R.
- Venue
- Philosophers without Gods
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York, NY
- Published
- 2007-08-08
- Pages
- 194-214
- OpenAlex
- W4388213277
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 46.23
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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