CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,217Philosophical Ethics and TheoryEmotions and Moral BehaviorPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning

Blackburn, Simon·1998
DOI 10.1093/oso/9780198247852.001.0001
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws also on game theory and cognitive science in his account of the structures of human motivation. Many philosophers have wanted a naturalistic ethics--a theory that integrates our understanding of human morality with the rest of our understanding of the world we live in. What is special about Blackburn's naturalistic ethics is that it does not debunk the ethical by reducing it to the non-ethical. At the same time he banishes the spectres of scepticism and relativism that have haunted recent moral philosophy. Ruling Passions sets ethics in the context of human nature: it offers a solution to the puzzle of how ethics can maintain its authority even though it is rooted in the very emotions and motivations that it exists to control.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oso/9780198247852.001.0001

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Blackburn, S.
Corresponding author
Blackburn, Simon
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Published
1998-09-24
DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198247852.001.0001
OpenAlex
W4388223145
Cited by
1,217
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 42 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 86 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 47 · 2017: 81 · 2016: 27 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 51 · 2012: 58
FWCI
26.84
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
Simon Blackburn, ethical naturalism, moral emotions, guilt, shame, disgust, motives, human nature, moral skepticism, moral relativism, emotions and morality, game theory, cognitive science

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review