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Free Will and Illusion
Abstract
Saul Smilansky presents an original treatment of the problem of free will, which lies at the heart of morality and human self-understanding. He maintains that we have most of the resources we need for a proper understanding of the problem; and the key to it is the role played by illusion. The major traditional philosophical approaches are inadequate, Smilansky argues: their partial insights need to be integrated into a hybrid view, which he calls Fundamental Dualism. Common views about justice, responsibility, human worth, and related notions are radically misguided, and the absurd looms large. We do, however, find some justification for enlightened moral views, and grounding for some of our most cherished views of human nature. The bold and perhaps disturbing claim of Free Will and Illusion is that we could not live adequately with a complete awareness of the truth about human freedom: illusion lies at the centre of the human condition. The necessity of illusion is seen to follow from the basic elements of the free will issue, helping keep our moral and psychological worlds intact. Smilansky offers the challenge of recognizing the centrality of illusion and trying to free ourselves to some extent from it; this is not only a philosophical challenge, but a moral and psychological one as well.
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Citations
Cited by
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Clarke, R. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 · Cited by 474
Strawson, G. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001 · Cited by 327
Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility
Roskies, A. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.011 · Cited by 284
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?
SARKISSIAN, H., CHATTERJEE, A., DE BRIGARD, F., KNOBE, J., NICHOLS, S., & SIRKER, S. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x · Cited by 283
Belief in Free Will: Measurement and Conceptualization Innovations
Rakos, R. F., Laurene, K. R., Skala, S., & Slane, S. (2008) · Behavior and Social Issues · doi:10.5210/bsi.v17i1.1929 · Cited by 159
Metadata
- Authors
- Smilansky, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2000-03-30
- OpenAlex
- W1588542075
- Cited by
- 397
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 5.79
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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