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Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology
Abstract
In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
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Citations
Cited by
Gallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881
The social neuroscience of empathy
Singer, T., & Lamm, C. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04418.x · Cited by 1,981
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060
Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010 · Cited by 1,050
Metadata
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1992-08-27
- OpenAlex
- W4388357755
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. (1992). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199245611.001.0001
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.