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Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise
Abstract
The phenomenon of persistent ethical disagreement is often cited in connection with the question of whether there is any ‘‘absolute’’ morality, or whether, instead, morality is in some sense merely ‘‘a matter of personal opinion’’. Citing disagreement, many people who hold strong views about controversial issues such as the permissibility of abortion, eating meat, or the death penalty deny that these views are anything more than ‘‘personal beliefs’’. But while there might be inconsistencies lurking in this position, it is not obviously at fault for according the facts about disagreement some epistemic weight.
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Citations
Cited by
Fake News and Partisan Epistemology
Rini, R. (2017) · Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal · doi:10.1353/ken.2017.0025 · Cited by 540
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)
Titelbaum, M. G. (2015) · Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0009 · Cited by 303
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
Clarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument
Bogardus, T. (2016) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/684711 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- McGrath, S.
- Venue
- Oxford Studies in Metaethics
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2008-06-19
- Pages
- 87-108
- OpenAlex
- W3122982735
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 23.89
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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