The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)
Abstract
This article defends the Fixed Point Thesis: that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. The Fixed Point Thesis is inspired by logical omniscience requirements in formal epistemology. It argues to the Fixed Point Thesis from the Akratic Principle: that rationality forbids having an attitude while believing that attitude is rationally forbidden. It then draws out surprising consequences of the Fixed Point Thesis, for instance that certain kinds of a priori justification are indefeasible and that misleading all-things-considered evidence about rational requirements is impossible. Finally, the Fixed Point Thesis is applied to defend the Right Reasons position on peer disagreement, according to which an agent who has drawn the correct conclusion from her evidence should retain belief in that conclusion even in the face of disagreeing peers.
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Cites
SCANLON, T. M. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv134vmrn · Cited by 3,041
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Williams, B. (2008) · Reasoning · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814273.005 · Cited by 1,338
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
Christensen, D. (2007) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-035 · Cited by 970
Wedgwood, R. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001 · Cited by 683
Oxford Studies In Epistemology
(2007) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199237067.001.0001 · Cited by 602
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Kelly, T. (2010) · Disagreement · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007 · Cited by 544
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-6461 · Cited by 490
Taking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.50-0205 · Cited by 432
Chalmers, D. J. (2012) · Cited by 370
Cited by
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Littlejohn, C. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4 · Cited by 95
ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISM
Reining, S. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.47 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Titelbaum, M. G.
- Venue
- Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2015-02-19
- Pages
- 253-294
- OpenAlex
- W2487487551
- Cited by
- 303
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 127.55
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Titelbaum, M. G. (2015). Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason). Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198722762.003.0009
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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