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Cited by 303

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Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)

Titelbaum, Michael G.·2015·Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5

Abstract

This article defends the Fixed Point Thesis: that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. The Fixed Point Thesis is inspired by logical omniscience requirements in formal epistemology. It argues to the Fixed Point Thesis from the Akratic Principle: that rationality forbids having an attitude while believing that attitude is rationally forbidden. It then draws out surprising consequences of the Fixed Point Thesis, for instance that certain kinds of a priori justification are indefeasible and that misleading all-things-considered evidence about rational requirements is impossible. Finally, the Fixed Point Thesis is applied to defend the Right Reasons position on peer disagreement, according to which an agent who has drawn the correct conclusion from her evidence should retain belief in that conclusion even in the face of disagreeing peers.

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Metadata

Authors
Titelbaum, M. G.
Venue
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5
Published
2015-02-19
Pages
253-294
OpenAlex
W2487487551
Cited by
303
References
20
FWCI
127.55
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason). https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0009
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Titelbaum, M. G. (2015). Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason). Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198722762.003.0009

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