Rationality and Psychology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article explores the debate over the extent to which ordinary human reasoning and decision making is rational. It starts by detailing some key experimental findings from the heuristics and biases tradition and describes a range of pessimistic claims about the rationality of ordinary people that these and related findings are sometimes taken to support. Such pessimistic interpretations of the experimental findings have not gone unchallenged, however, and one of the most sustained and influential critiques come from evolutionary psychology. This article outlines some of the research on reasoning that has been done by evolutionary psychologists and describes a cluster of more optimistic theses about ordinary reasoning that such psychologists defend. Although this article states that the most dire pronouncements made by writers in the heuristics and biases tradition are unwarranted, it also maintains that the situation is rather more pessimistic than sometimes suggested by evolutionary psychologists.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1 · Cited by 1,047
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Stanovich, K. E. (2009) · In two minds: Dual processes and beyond · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0003 · Cited by 514
West, R. F., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2008) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0012842 · Cited by 416
A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences
Gintis, H. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000581 · Cited by 416
Metadata
- Authors
- Samuels, R., & Stich, S. P.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-09-02
- Pages
- 279-300
- OpenAlex
- W2105219125
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 12.35
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.