The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System
Abstract
Congress can exert control over regulatory agencies either through oversight or through statutory control provisions that establish agency structure and process. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and each is employed in varying degress in different policy areas. Although decisions about oversight and statutory control are separate, they are not independent. Plans to engage in ex post oversight make the benefits of statutory control less compelling and vice versa. In this sense, statutory control and oversight can be viewed as “substitutes” in the “production” of a controlled bureaucracy. From a legislator's point of view, the benefits of the two strategies depend on the policy area, the political environment, and the legislator's position within Congress. These exogenous factors determine a legislator's ideal level of each control strategy. Considering the two types of control in a single model leads to the finding that legislators who are members of the committee with jurisdiction over the agency prefer a lower level of statutory control than nonmembers. The difference occurs because the costs of oversight are lower for committee members. This prediction is tested using data from two bills that delegated policy decisions to the EPA.
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Cites
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Cited by
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Thatcher, M., & Sweet, A. S. (2002) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/713601583 · Cited by 812
KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 636
Bendor, J., Glazer, A., & Hammond, T. (2001) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.235 · Cited by 450
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Huber, J. D., Shipan, C. R., & Pfahler, M. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669344 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Bawn, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-04-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101-126
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2161355345
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bawn, K. (1997). Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023375
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