Cited by 51Public Policy and Administration ResearchManagement and Organizational StudiesEconomic Theory and Institutions

Problem Solving and Institutional Design

Open access
Donald Chisholm·1995·Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Abstract

The most prominent contemporary approach to institutions asserts that they result from self-interested, maximizing choice from among some array of alternative forms that biases outcomes in certain directions. But institutions such as large-scale formal organizations also are powerful instruments for solving difficult problems. From this perspective, founded in the institutionalism of the late nineteenth century and grounded in cognitive psychology and procedural rationality, choices about institutional forms are principally a function of identifying and representing problems and generating alternatives for their solution. Contemporary public policy problems are characterized by organized complexity and are largely illstructured. Consequently, the most difficult task for decision makers is to comprehend the problems they confront and, because alternatives are rarely given, to devise institutional forms that can effectively redress those problems. This article proposes and elaborates an empirically based problem-solving theory of institutions.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037259

Cites

62 of 62 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Problems-as-processed by authoritative policymakers frequently entail path-dependent, pre-structured problem definitions that exclude newly emerging and promising alternative solutions seriously considered by other actors.

    “Frequently, problems-as-processed by authoritative policymakers entail path-dependent, pre-structured problem definitions (Chisholm, 1995) that exclude newly emerging and promising alternative solutions seriously considered by other actors.”

    From Problematizing ‘wickedness’: a critique of the wicked problems concept, from philosophy to practice (2019) · cites this paper as Chisholm, 1995

    The Implications for Research section says earlier decisions structure future choices, while section 1A says more developed problem representations make fewer alternatives acceptable. These passages support path-dependent definitions that constrain alternatives, but they do not establish that authoritative policymakers frequently exclude newly emerging, promising solutions seriously considered by other actors. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 54

  1. Axelrod, Robert. 1976. The Analysis of Cogmtive Maps. In Robert Axelrod, Editor. Structure ofDecision: The Coffiitive Maps of Political Elites. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  2. Bendor, Jonathan B. 1985. Parallel Systems. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
  3. Brent, Joseph. 1993. Charles Sanders Peirce, ALife. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
  4. Cogan, Morris L. 1953. Toward a Definition of Profession. Harvard Educational Review 23: 33-50.
  5. Desveaui^James A. ms. Designing Organizations: Institutional Capacity in Large-Scale Problem Solving. Palo Alto, Califorma: Stanford University Press.
  6. DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1991. Introduction, in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, Editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
  7. Fumer, Mary. 1975.Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professiontdization ofAmerican Social Science. Lexmgton, Kentucky. University Press of Kentucky.
  8. George, Alexander. 1970. The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System. In Lawrence Falkowski, Editor. PsychologicalModels and International Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
  9. Hanf, Kenneth and Fritz W. Scharpf, Editors. 1978. Interorganizational PolicyMaking. Limits to Coordination and Central Control. London: Sage Publications.
  10. John R. Commons, HisAssaulton Laissez-Faire. Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Press.
  11. Hartshorne, Charles and Paul Weiss. 1934. The Collected Papers of CharlesSanders Peirce, Volume V: Pragfnatism and Pragmaticism. Cambridge; Harvard University Press.
  12. Haskell, Thomas L. 1977. The Emergence of Professional Social Science. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
  13. Janowitz, Morris. 1960. TheProfessional Soldier. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.
  14. Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. In Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, Editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, Tllinnk- University of Chicago Press.
  15. Karsten, Peter. 1972. The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age ofAnnapolis and the Emergence ofModem American Navalism. New York: The Free Press.
  16. Katz, Daniel and Robert Kahn. 1966. The Social Psychology ofOrganizations. New York: Wiley.
  17. Landau, Martin. 1979. The Role of Metaphor in Political Analysis. In Martin Landau, Political Theory and Political Science. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press. .1973. On the Concept of aSelf-correcting Organization. Public Administration Review 33: 533-542; . 1971_ Linkage, Coding, and Intermediacy. Joumal ofComparative Politics 2: 401-429. 1969 Redundancy, Reliability, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap. Public Administration Review 29: 346-358.
  18. LaPorte, Todd R. 1975. Organized Social Complexity: Explication ofa Concept. In Todd R. LaPorte, Editor. Orgmized Social Complexity: Challenge to Politics and Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  19. Lasswell, H^old D. 1950. The Policy Orientation. In Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lemer, Editors. The Policy Sciences. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
  20. Lemer, Max. 1954. Charles Beard's Political Theory, inHoward K. Beale, Editor. Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press.
  21. Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. The Science ofMuddling Through. Public Adminstration Review 19: 79-88.
  22. Lyles, Marjories A. and Ian I. Mitroff. 1980. Organizational Problem Formulation: An F.mnirirfll Study Administrative Science Quarterly 25:102-119.
  23. McKee, Christopher. 1991. AGentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation ofthe U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815. Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press.
  24. Marcell, David W. 1974. Progress and Pragmatism: James. Dewey, Beard, and die American Idea ofProgress. Westport, Coimecticut: Greenwood Press.
  25. March, J^es G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis ofPolitics. New York: The Free Press.
  26. 19^. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. y4wencan Political Science Review 78: 734-749. . 1979 Ambiffiity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.
  27. Merriam, Charles E. 1924. New Aspects ofPolitics. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
  28. Moe, Terry M. 1990. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213-266. 1987. Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NRLB. Studies in American Political Development 2: 236-299. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science 28: 739-777.
  29. Nelson, Richard and Sidney Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
  30. NeweU, Allan, J.C. Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving. Psychological Review 65: 151-166.
  31. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, andEconomic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142: 230 237.
  32. Parsons, Talcott. 1954. Motivation of Economic Theory. In Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Revised Edition. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. . 1954. The Professions and Social Structure. In Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Revised Edition. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.
  33. Paullin, Charles Oscar. 1968. Paullin's History ofNaval Administration 1775-1911: A Collection ofArticles From the U.S. NavalInstitute Proceedings. Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press.
  34. Posner, Richard A. 1981. The Economics ofJustice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
  35. Pounds, William F. 1969. The Process of Problem Finding. Industrial Management Review 11: 1-19.
  36. Rader, Benj^in G. 1966. The Academic Mind and Reform; The Influence ofRichard T. Ely in American Life. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press.
  37. Reitman, Walter. 1964. Heuristic Decision Procedures, Open Constraints,and the Nature of 111 Defined Problems. In M.W. Shelley, II and G.L. Bryan, Editors. Human Judanents and Optimality. New York: John Wiley.
  38. Riggs, Fred W. 1966. The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change andDevelopment. Honolulu, Hawaii: East West Center Press.
  39. • 1977. Does Organization Matter? Task Structure and Interaction m the Ministerial Bureaucracy. In E.H. Burack and A.R. Negandhi, Editors. Organizational Desigp: Theoretical Perspectives andEmpirical Findings. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.
  40. Schotter, Andrew. 1981. The Economic Theory ofSocial Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  41. Siffin, William J. 1966. The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development. Honolulu, Hawaii: East -West Center Press.
  42. • 1978a. On How to Decide What to Do. Bell Journal ofEconomics 9: 494-507.
  43. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. .1976. From Substantive to Procedural Rationality. In Spiro J. Latsis, Editor. Method and Appraisal in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. •1975a. The Functional Equivalence of Problem Solving Skills. Cognitive Psychology 7: 268-288. . 197^. Style in Design. In J. Archea and C. Eastman, Editors. Proceeding ofthe 2nd Annual Environmental Design Research Association Conference, October 1970. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie- Mellon University Press.
  44. •1963. On the Concept of Organizational Goal. Administrative Science Quarterly 8: 1-22. 1962. The Architecture of Complexity. Proceedings of theAmerican Philosophical Society 106: 467 482. 1960. The Executive as Decision Maker, and Organizational Design: Man-Machine Systems for Decision Making. In Herbert A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision. New York: Harper and Row.
  45. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  46. Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacity, 1877-1920. Cambridge: England: Cambridge University Press.
  47. Stevenson, James P. 1993. The Pentagon Paradox: The Development ofthe F-18 Hornet. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute Press.
  48. Thompson, Victor. 1976. Bureaucracy and the Modem World. Morristown, New Jersey: General Tj-aminp Press. •1974. The Development of Modem Bureaucracy: Tools Out ofPeople. Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press.
  49. Veblen, Thorstein. i919 [1898]. Why Is Economics Not An Evolutionary Science? Quarterly Journal of Economics, July 1898, reprinted in Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modem Civilization and Other Essays. New York: Huebsch.
  50. In G.H. Bower, Editor. ThePsychology of Learning and Motivation: Advancesin Research Theory New York: Academic Press.
  51. Wallas, Graham. 1948 [1905]. Human Nature in Politics, 4th Edition, with a foreword by A.L. Rowse. London: Constable and Company, Ltd.
  52. Wildavsky, Aaron. 1994. WhySelf-Interest Means Less Outside of a Social Context: Cultural Contributions to a Theory of Rationd Choices. Joumal of Theoretical Politics 6: 131-159. . 1972. The Self-Evaluating Organization. PublicAdministration Review 32: 509-520.
  53. Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transactions Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology 87: 548-577. . 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
  54. Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. The Study of Adminstration. Political Science Quarterly 2:197-222.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Chisholm, D.
Affiliations
University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Corresponding author
Donald Chisholm
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Published
1995-10
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
OpenAlex
W2339180095
Cited by
51
References
24
Citations by year
2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2012: 2
FWCI
1.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
institutional design, problem solving, institutionalism, procedural rationality, cognitive psychology, ill-structured problems, problem representation, formal organizations, decision-making

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review